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let  the  external  costs  be  internalized?  In  order  to  provide  an  answer,  a  Coasian
approach  is undertaken. The  starting point  is  an original  interpretation of  the  so‑
called Coase  Theorem, which  is  derived  from  Forte  (2007).  Forte  argues  that  the
symmetry underlying the theorem can only be held true in the short run. In the long





that  it  is  not  always  efficient  to  follow  the  Polluter  Pays  Principle.  In  fact, while
pollution  is  a  negative  externality,  the  venture  that  causes  it  may  also  generate
positive externalities. When this is the case, by imposing to the polluter the cost of
getting  rid  of  pollution,  the  positive  externality  may  be  lost  together  with  the














cost  of pollution  (or  the  cost  of  eliminating pollution) bear on  the polluted party,





become  available.  Policies  should  instead  focus  on  accelerating  the  process  of
technological innovation, and on developing adaptation measures in order to better
face the effects, rather than addressing the alleged causes, of global warming.








obsolete  technology.  An  analogy  is  then made with  the  pattern  governing  other








GDP  growth  is  not  the  only  independent  variable.  The  existence  of  free  market
institutions  also  matter,  in  that  this  allows  GDP  growth  and  creates  a  more
favourable environment for  investments. An empirical measure of  the existence of
free  market  institutions  has  been  gleaned  by  the  Index  of  Economic  Freedom,
published yearly by the Heritage Foundation and the Wall Street  Journal. A panel





– along with other  factors – may explain part of  the difference  in carbon  intensity
between countries. The correlation is stronger for lower values of economic freedom,
consistently with other  evidence  that  correlates  economic  freedom with  economic
growth. There are theoretical reasons to believe that the correlation may be a sign of a
causal link, even though the empirical evidence is still not enough to support such a
claim.  If  the  causal  link  should  be  proven  true,  a  policy  consequence  would  be
that–all  else  being  equal–increasing  economic  freedom might  lead  to  a  reduced
carbon  intensity  in  the  developing  world,  which  is  expected  to  account  for  an










emissions  is negligible, as  is  their possible consequences on  temperatures  rise and
global warming. This means that EU policies, absent an international cooperation on
curbing emissions, can’t hold vis‑à‑vis any cost‑benefit analysis, however low is the
“cost”  side.  The  existing  policies  are  not  only  unlikely  to  deliver  a  measurable
environmental  benefit:  they  are  also  working  very  poorly.  The  most  important
European policy is the Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS), a cap & trade scheme that


























warming an  interpretation of  the Coase Theorem provided by Forte  (2007). Under
this  framework,  the  symmetry  regarding  the  initial  allocation  of  the  rights  in  the
Coase Theorem applies only to the short run. In the long run, the initial allocation of










the  process  of  decoupling).  If  instead  there  is  and  will  be  a  tradeoff,  a  careful
assessment  should  be made  of  what  is  at  stake.  Global  warming,  as  an  external
diseconomy, might be the other side of economic growth, as an external economy. In
this case, fighting global warming at the cost of curbing economic growth may not be
justified,  that  is,  it may be reasonable  to give  the polluter  (present generation)  the











collectively. According  to  the  conventional  story‑telling about  climate, man‑made
greenhouse gases  (GHGs), mostly produced by  the  combustion of  fossil  fuels,  are
causing global  average  temperatures  to  rise. Temperature  rise would determine a
number of consequences, most of which are supposedly negative, including (but not
limited  to)  sea  level  rise,  desertification,  a  wide  change  in  climate  patterns,  an



















(b),  except  for assuming  that a  significant degree of uncertainty  is attached  to  (b),
which means that any policy which is designed to address global warming should be
3flexible enough to be adapted to new scientific evidence regarding the role of natural
causes,  changing  temperature patterns,  or new economic  evidence on  the  costs of
global warming and the benefits of climate policies. In turn, this paper will deal with
(c),  (d),  and  (e). We will  try  to  show  that  the  economic  evidence  that  the  costs  of
global warming are such that require immediate action is less clear than commonly
believed, partly because climate change may not be a market  failure. By  the  same
token, the benefits of political action may be lower than expected, particularly in the
light  of  a  theoretical  framework  that  can  be  derived  from  the  so  called  “Coase
Theorem” (Coase 1960; Coase 1990; Stigler 1966; Medema and Zerbe 2000). In fact, the
Coase Theorem will hereby be revisited,  following Forte  (2007a),  in order  to show
that it was not in Ronald Coase intention’s, nor is a logical consequence of his 1960
Nobel Prize‑awarded essay, to claim that the mere presence of a “public good” or of




public  good,  because  each  country’s  release  of  GHGs  augments  the  world’s
atmospheric  stock  in  an  additive  fashion  and  each  country’s  cutback  results  in  a
greater  cost  than  benefit  for  that  country  unless  assurances  can  be  given  that  a








Michel  (2007,  p.5)  argues  that  “every  country has an  interest  in  ensuring a  stable
climate  system.  But  every  country  also  as  an  interest  in  ensuring  economic
development, agricultural production, energy supply,  industry,  transportation,  the
whole  panoply  of  human  enterprise  from which  greenhouse  emissions  arise.  The
common  interest of all states in controlling global warming thus contends with the
individual  interest  of  each  state  in  continuing  the  emitting  activities  that  cause
climate  change”  (emphasis  added). While  this  statement may  appear  obvious,  it
contains  two  strong  logical mistakes, which deserve  to  be dismantled  in  order  to
proceed with an ordered discussion of the issue.
4The first mistake is an inappropriate generalization: as it will be shown, it is not true
that  every  country  has  an  interest  in  countering  global  warming.  In  fact,  global
warming – defined as the increase in the global average temperature – is a complex
phenomenon, which  can  also be  seen  as  the  aggregate  of  individual  changes.  For
example, not always temperature increase is bad per se. There is evidence that cold
regions will  benefit  from warming;  by  the  same  token,  there  is  evidence  that  an
increased concentration of GHGs in the atmosphere – particularly CO2 – might result
in faster plant growth, under appropriate conditions. So, some countries or economic




time,  in  economic  growth  (which  determines  GHGs  emissions)  and  in  cutting
emissions. There is clearly a trade off between the two goals, at least in the short run.
Again,  it  can  be  argued  that  the  benefits  of  economic  growth  are  not  enough  to
compensate the costs of global warming, but one can hardly have the pie and eat it
too.
Helm (2008, p.225) states  that global warming  is “a public bad” (no  justification  is
provided),  while  the  famous  Stern  Review  (Stern  2006)  suggests  it  is  the  biggest
externality ever (interestingly, and erroneously, enough, Stern does not distinguish
between the natural and the anthropogenic components of climate change). A more
sophisticated argument  comes  from Nordhaus  (2005, p.4), who argues  that global











the  amount  of  emissions  that  each  country  has  generated)  and  over  time.  A
consequence of  this,  as Nordhaus  (2005, p.7)  shows,  is  that “there exists  today no
workable market or governmental mechanism that is appropriate for the problems.
There  is  no  mechanism  by  which  global  citizens  can  make  binding  collective
decisions to slow global warming”. Finally, Gardiner (2007) defined global warming
as “the perfect moral storm”.
To make  the  picture more  confused,  it  should  be  emphasized  that  – while most
authors speak about climate – they are in fact referring to climate stability, or, to be














As Robinson (2008) argues,  the  idea  that climate  is a public good, hence collective
action is needed, may well be defined as “conventional wisdom”, in the sense defined
by  Galbraith  (1958).  Robinson  himself  exposes  a  number  of  reasons  why  such
wisdom is rather a prejudice. One reason is its very theoretical foundation, according
to which  the mere existence of a public good or an externality provides a case  for
government  intervention  aimed  at  the  provision  of  the  public  good  or  the
internalization of the externality. Such idea has been challenged by many economists,





































the  rights  to  the  forest‑owner may prevent him  from adopting  low cost measures
aimed  at  reducing  the  risk  of  fires  (say,  keeping  lower  trees).  So,  by  shifting  the
liability onto the polluter may result in a sub‑optimal employment of resources – an
higher  amount  of which would  be  spent  by  issuing  compensations  to  the  forest‑
owner or by paying for a spark‑free technology, or both. Not irrelevant to this, is that
the information about the most efficient way of caring about the tress, and the cost of




in  a  transaction‑free  world,  if  the  original  rights  are  assigned  to  the  polluted
community,  one may  expect  to  have  less  industrial  goods  in  the  long  run.  If  the
output of  the  industry is energy, one would expect  less, more costly energy.  If  the
business of energy production becomes less profitable, investments may fall, too, and
as a consequence the probability of technological advancements declines, including










external  negative  effects  are  always  distorting.  The  same  is  true  with  positive
externalities. My additional  conclusion  is  that  both may be  important  to promote
economic  growth”.  If  this  is  true,  a  state  intervention  aimed  at  removing  the
externality, may generate itself a greater external diseconomy.
1.4. The costs and benefits of (in)action
How, and to what extent, does  this apply  to climate? Before a proper argument  is
developed, it may be worth recalling what the available literature tells about the costs
and  cost  structure  of  global warming  and  of  policies  aimed  at mitigating  global
warming. Figure 1 shows the available results, as presented by Tol and Yohe (2006).














effects.  Tol  and Yohe  (2006), Helm  (2008), Henderson  et  al.  (2006)  and Nordhaus
(2008,  pp.165‑190)  provide  persuasive  criticisms  of  the  Review’s  methodology,
results,  and  internal  consistency. Helm  (2008, p.228)  claims  that  the zero‑discount
approach  relies upon a “moral  argument”  that, however philosophically  relevant,
tells  little  in  terms  of  welfare  and  provides  little  basis  for  the  creation  of  the
international consensus that is needed for climate action to be taken.
Others, most notably Weitzman (2009, p.1), argue that “the probability of a disastrous










“fat‑tailers”  tend  to  emphasize  that,  in  presence  of wide  and  deep  uncertainties,
policies should be as flexible and little‑distorting as possible (see for example Taleb
2007);  and  the  legal  consequence  is  that  “simple  rules”  should  be  adopted  “for  a
complex world”  (Epstein  1995).  But when  it  comes  to  climate,  a more  aggressive
attitude  seems  to  emerge,  based on  the  assumption  that  “it might  happen  so we





other  targets  (for  example  substituting  income  taxes  in  order  to  reduce  the
deadweight loss). (On the benefits of revenue‑neutral carbon taxes see also Nordhaus
2008, pp.148‑164 and Chapter 3 of this thesis).
It  should  also  be  added  that  the  costs  of  global  warming  can’t  be  immediately
compared with the costs of emission reductions, insofar as the former do not coincide
with the benefits of the latter. In other words, some amount of global warming is still
to  be  expected  even  if  the  most  radical  policies  are  implemented  to  reduce
9anthropogenic GHGs.  So,  at  least  part  of  the  costs will  persist  in  the  future.  This
means that the costs of global warming provide by definition an overestimate of the
benefits  of  climate  policies.  The  cost  of  climate  policies,  moreover,  is  also
underestimated  because  it  relies  on  an  implicit  assumption  of  efficient
implementation,  that  is  not  credible. As Helm  (2008, pp.225‑226)  argues,  “climate








the short  run  (hence  the preference  for moderate, not  radical,  immediate emission




medium  run  (the  so  called  mitigation),  but  at  long‑run‑oriented  goals  such  as
preventing  (rather  than  solving)  climate‑change  related problems or  achieving  an
economically  sustainable  de‑carbonization  of  the  economy  through  technology
improvements.
Goklany (2007), for example, argues that climate change doesn’t create problems, it
rather  exacerbates  existing  problems,  especially  in  the  developing  and  the  least
developed world. Hunger, thirst, and malaria, as well as other negative consequences
of  global warming, will  not  arise  after  the  global  average  temperature will  have
increased by  a given  amount,  however defined. They  all  are  already here. Global
warming  may  just  make  them  worse.  The  relevant  fact,  then,  is  that  even  the
developed  world  used  to  suffer  from  them,  and  could  defeat  them  despite  the
moderate increase in world temperatures observed in the last couple of centuries. As
Goklany states, “most of the improvements in climate‑sensitive indicators of human

















invested  for  today’s  technological  change  are  subtracted  from  innovative
investments).
1.5. The Polluter, the Polluted, and the Pollution
How  does  the  Forte  interpretation  of  the  Coase  Theorem  apply  to  the  above
discussion?  To  summarize  once  again,  Forte  showed  that,  even  in  absence  of
transaction costs,  (a)  there  is no absolute asymmetry  in  the  initial  rights allocation













The  polluter  is  the  present  and  past  generations.  Since  global  warming  is  a
consequence of the accumulation of GHGs in the atmosphere, whoever did, does, or











from, so any single country or  individual  is directly responsible  for  the amount of
emissions it has generated. Yet, the impact of the amount of emissions that any given
individual,  even  those who  live  a  very  carbon‑intensive  life  such  as Nobel  Prize
winner Al Gore (Schweizer 2006), is negligible (Reisman 2002). According to the legal
rule that liability can just be individual, and consistently with the “de minimis non
curat praetor”, nobody can be held  responsible  for  anything. Even  if  one  looks at
countries,  rather  than  individual,  the aggregate amount of emissions generated by
most countries in the past two hundred centuries is very low, if compared with the
amount of GHGs  that  can have a discernible  impact on climate – perhaps  just  the
wealthiest  and/or most  populated  countries  in  the world,  such  as  the US,  former

















or  will  not,  per  se,  cause  harm  to  anybody,  at  least  in  a  strict  sense.  With  the
conventional sources of pollution, for examples particulates, asbestos, lead, or carbon






health  effects”  (p.157).  As  to  the  other  GHGs,  the  expected  concentrations  for
methane  are  “well  below  any  recommended  exposure  limits”  (p.157);  the
concentrations  of  nitrous  oxide will  be  “well  below  any  recommended  exposure
limits” (p.158); and the concentrations of fluorinated gases will be “many orders of
magnitude  below  the  exposure  limits”  (p.158).  This  tells  nothing  about  the













global warming  is  the  same  as  total  global warming,  but  this  inevitably  leads  to




unknown. Obviously,  at  least  some  people  (for  example  those  in  the  business  of
tourism  in places  that would  experience  longer  and warmer  Summers)  and  some
countries  (for  example  cold  countries  in  the  higher  latitudes) would  benefit  from
global warming. For them, global warming is a positive externality, not a negative
one.  Even  assuming  that  the  aggregate  costs  from warming  are  higher  than  the
aggregate  benefits,  how  would  this  be  addressed?  Would  they  have  a  right  to
compensation? According  to  Brubaker  (1975,  p.157),  collective  action  “results  in
‘forced  riding’  by  individuals  who  are  coerced  into  expressing  non‑existent
‘demands’  for  collective  goods. Or worse  a  ‘good’  in  fact may  be  a  bad,  in  some
views, from which is economically not feasible for the individual to exclude himself,
and  for which  compensation may  be  appropriate”.  Therefore,  collective  action  to






A right  to  experience Summer or Winter  as  they used  to be,  or  a  right  to  a given
temperature, can’t be defined not  just because the legal or economic bases to do so
are  lacking.  It  can’t  be  defined  for  the mere  reason  that  such  a  right  couldn’t  be




ability  to predict weather  in a way  that make  it possible  to make plans –  to make
decisions concerning whether or not farming a piece of land and how, whether or not




what  is  the  threshold beyond which global warming becomes a “bad”? One naïve
answer might be, that global warming becomes a bad when, and to the extent that,
global  temperatures  exceed  the pre‑industrial  level.  That would  imply  the  all  the
emissions‑generating activities that have taken place in the past 150 years are to be
considered  “costly”.  To  our  knowledge,  however,  nobody  has  ever  argued  that
humanity  today  is  worse  off,  because  it  lives  in  a  warmer  planet,  where  some
biodiversity  loss  may  have  occurred  because  of  the  man‑induced  temperature
increases  (Goldberg  2007;  Stagnaro  2007).  Alternatively,  it  may  be  identified  a
“temperature  threshold”  beyond  which  the  expected  effects  of  global  warming
become intolerable. This is the choice made by the European Union, that adopted the
goal of keeping temperature increases below 2°C more than the pre‑industrial levels.
However,  this  is  questionable not  just  because  such  a  threshold  –  given  the wide





GHGs molecules  in  the  atmosphere  –  may  be  such  that  temperatures  will  keep
growing  beyond  the  threshold  even  if  anthropogenic  emissions  fall  to  zero
immediately.
Finally, the need to identify a threshold begs a significant problem regarding the very
concept  of  optimal  temperature.  It  should  be  recalled  that  climate  has  always
changed,  and  it  always  will:  which  means  that  temperatures  either  increase,  or
decrease. Claiming that we should stop temperature rise and keep temperatures in
the nearby of  the present  levels,  seems  to  rely on  the assumption  that  the present
temperatures are the optimal ones (a very fortunate coincidence). After all, if climate
stability is a public good ‑   That means that lower temperatures would be harmful,











is  all  but  trivial.  First,  it  relies  upon  how  global warming will  turn  out  to  be,  as
opposed to what scenarios suggest. If the increase in world average temperature will
be slow and mild, it is likely that the next generation will not experience significant












the  far  distant  future  are magnified  by  the  zero‑discounting,  but  they  can hardly
provide useful information, as they rely on scenarios on climate, economic growth,
technology, etc. that can be fairly described as “assumptions”.








Perhaps  they  will  want  a  cooler  world;  or  perhaps  they  won’t  care  about
temperatures, and will want us  to pass  them on a  richer world, with more capital
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accumulation  and more  technology.  As Cordato  (1999,  p.9)  puts  it,  “This  would
require information about the course of future technological change, entrepreneurial
insights, and innovation. More importantly, it would require information about these
variables  both  in  the  absence  and  in  the  presence  of  the  policy.  Clearly,  this  is
information  that we  can  only  pretend  to  have.  Even  if  this  information  could  be
‘known,’ the analyst would somehow have to be able to assess the ‘aggregate amount
of satisfaction,’ a concept that would first have to be defined in an ‘operational’ way,
that would be experienced  in  the presence and absence of  the policy. The kind of
information  that  would  be  necessary  to  make  these  precise  interpersonal  and
intergenerational  cost  comparisons  required  to  justify  the policy  is practically and
conceptually impossible to gather”.
Vis‑à‑vis  the unknowable,  it  seems naïve  to  try and model  the distant  future. Too
many  information are  lacking,  including  those affecting climate patterns.  It  seems
more reasonable to focus on information regarding the effects from global warming










hardly  be  better  off. Most  notably,  that  is  true  even  as  far  as  the  environment  is
concerned.
Part of the misconceptions related to the future impacts from global warming, derive











understand  this  fact,  and  its  theoretical  foundations,  undermines  a  proper
understanding of what  lies  in  front of us. Examples of such misunderstanding are
wide and common.
For  example, Helm  (2008, p.223)  claims:  “The oceans  are  already highly polluted,
agricultural  land  is  being  affected  by  salinization  and  desertification,  and  global
warming will  have  serious  effects  on  the  areas where population  is most  heavily
concentrated”. The temptation arises, to comment upon this by quoting Coase (1990,
p.211) on the lighthouse economic literature: “How is that these great men have, in





as  a  proof  of  the  (supposedly  man‑induced)  increasing  pollution.  Data  on  the
pollution of  coastal waters  in  the developed world do not univocally  support  this




As  far  as  forests  are  concerned,  “Some  regions… have made  significant progress;
institutions  are  strong,  and  forest  area  is  stable  or  increasing.  Other  regions…
continue to  lose forest area… However, even in regions that are  losing forest area,
there  a  number  of  positive  trends”  (FAO  2007,  p.viii).  On  desertification  and
salinization,  the  evidence  is  mixed  and  different  authors  provide  different
interpretation both on  the extent of  the phenomena,  and  their  causes  (Cotton and
Pielke 2007).
A  positive  trend  is  also  evident  for  a  number  of  other  environmental  indicators,
including  those  relating  to  air  quality,  water  quality,  lands  and  forests,  toxic
pollution, etc. For example, Lomborg  (2001, p.177)  summarizes his  findings on air
pollution as follows: “The achievement of dramatically decreasing concentrations of
the major air pollutants in the Western world… is amazing by itself. But it is all the








for  human  beings  –  has  been  improving  for  decades.  Several  positive  trends  are
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shown,  for  example,  by  Lomborg  (2001)  and  Hayward  (2008).  A  theoretical
framework  on  why  environmental  quality  tends  to  improve  in  the  long  run  is
provided by Simon (1996) and Goklany (2007), among the others.





does  exist, while  others  argue  the  problem  is  either misinterpreted  or  it  is  in  the
process of being solved. Controversy over data should not lead to immediate, radical
action, but  to  an attempt of more objectively  assess  the  reality.  It  also means  that
specific problems should be addressed, possibly in specific ways, while it may not be
the best strategy to put altogether as if an “environmental problem” did exist which
stems  from one  single  cause  and  can  be  solved  by  one  single,  global measure  or
policy.
To  summarize,  at  least  so  long  as  the  past  is  concerned,  human  and  economic
development is inherently bond with carbon‑based sources of energy. It is also clear




To  estimate  the  costs  of  mitigation,  however,  a  portfolio  of  low‑  or  zero‑carbon
technologies should be available, that can substitute fossil fuels at an acceptable cost.
Unfortunately, so far there seems to be little evidence that the various political and
technological  proposals  that  have  been  set  forth will  not  fall  short  of  their  goals
(Pacala and Socolow 2004). Apparently, the most promising strategy to reduce carbon
emissions increase in the next few decades come from technological transfer and the
modernization  of  the  industrial  base  in  the  emerging  economies  (Bernstein  et  al.
2006). Unfortunately, technology transfer – however useful – in the short run can at
most save potential emissions, rather than reducing emissions in absolute terms. In
fact,  virtually  no  credible  scenario  forecasts  a  reduction  in  global  emissions,
particularly  in the emerging economies,  in the next few years or  in the foreseeable
future. Moreover, since global warming is a strongly inertial process, whatever will
be done in the short run, by developing countries, developed countries, or both, will
have  little  effect  in  the  short  run.  The  results will  be  delivered  in  the  longer  run
(which  is  one  reason  why  international  agreements  are  so  hard  to  close  –  see
Enevoldsen 2005).





the atmosphere  caused an  increase  in global  average  temperatures by x, a  further
temperature  increase by  the same amount  requires GHGs concentration  to double
again. To put it otherwise, the amount of temperature increase that can be attributed
to  any given molecule  of GHG  is  lower  than  that  of  the previous molecules,  and





4°C by 2100. This means that  there  is a chance the goal of  the EU policy –  to keep
temperature increase below 2°C – will be met even in the absence of specific policies
(if  the lower estimate is  true), as well as there is a chance that  it will never be met
even  under  the most  ambitious  policies  (if  the  higher  estimate  is  true).  The  low
probability  of  European  policies  having  a  significant  impact  on  temperatures
depends not  just on  the  fact  that Europe alone accounts  for a  small and declining




emissions  reductions  are  highly  sensitive  to  the  level  of  reductions,  while  the
marginal  benefits  of  emissions  reductions  are  insensitive  to  the  current  level  of
emissions reductions” (see also Pizer 1999 and Hoel and Karp 2001). A consequence






The  simplest  way  to  reduce  emissions,  in  fact,  is  to  curb  economic  growth.












Figure  2.  Energy  (1971‑2001),  Population, GDP,  and CO2  emissions  (1960‑2001)
growth. Each variable has been adjusted so that the 1990 level is set equal to 100.
Source: Elaboration on the World Bank’s World Development Indicators.
The  apparent  aim  of  climate policies,  is  to decouple  emissions growth  from GDP
growth, which may or may not  entail decoupling  energy  consumption  from GDP
growth. Absolute  decoupling  refers  to  the  fact  that GDP  grows, while  emissions
stabilize  or  decline.  There  is  no  evidence  that  absolute  decoupling  does  or  will
happen  in  the  foreseeable  future  at  a  global  level;  a  few  examples  of  absolute







economic growth; Mazzarino  (2000)  and Gonzales and Suarez  (2003) obtained  the
same  result,  respectively,  for  Italy  and  Spain.  At  the  same  time,  there  is  some
encouraging  evidence  from other  sources  of pollution,  as  it  has  been  emphasized
above.  In  fact,  as  to most  pollutants  of  the  past,  a  “bell‑shaped  curve”  has  been
observed, whereby the amount of pollution grows up to a point together with GDP
or GDP per capita, and after that stabilizes and eventually declines. A huge amount
of  literature has addressed  this  so called “Environmental Kuznets Curve”,  since  it
was introduced by such authors as Grossman and Krueger (1995); Selden and Song
(1994);  Shafik  and  Bandhopadyaya  (1992)  (for  a  longer  discussion  on  the
Environmental Kuznets Curve for carbon, see Chapter 2). As to carbon dioxide and
other GHGs the evidence is mixed, to say the least. Some authors, such as Goklany
(2007), argue  that what he calls  the “ecological  transition” –  that  is,  the shift  from
more  polluting  to  less  polluting  technologies  as GDP  and  the  technological  level








(a) Environmental Kuznets Curve will  eventually  show up  for GHGs,  in which
case  the market will  take  care  of  global warming  –  even  though  collective
action  may  be  needed  either  to  increase  resilience  against  the  adverse
consequences of global warming, or to accelerate the process;
(b) Environmental  Kuznets  Curve  will  not  show  up,  in  which  case  carbon
emissions will never be decoupled from economic growth – that is, any policy
aimed at cutting emissions, will subsequently curb economic growth;
(c) The  existence  of  Environmental Kuznets Curve  for GHGs depends  on  local
variables, which means that some countries will eventually be able to decouple












atmospheric  concentrations  of  GHGs  have  reached  a  dangerous  level.  Ideally,





the  external  diseconomy  (global  warming)  can’t  be  decoupled  from  the  external
economy  (GDP growth)  in  the  short  run. A consequence of  this  is  that any policy
aimed at curbing emissions would reduce GDP growth as well, and would delay –
instead of making faster – the ecological transition (Goklany 2007). In the short run,
any such policy would either be  ineffective  (if GDP growth  is  to be preserved), or
economically very negative (if emissions are to be cut), especially for the low‑income














that  encourages  economic  growth  as  a  solution  to  environmental  problems,
particularly global warming.
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and  Socolow  2004).  For  example,  with  regard  to  solar  power  –  which  is  widely
regarded  as  the  most  promising  technology  –  even  under  the  most  favorable
assumptions,  will  not  be  competitive  or  technically  feasible  on  a  large  scale  for
decades (Borenstein 2008; Bradford 2008). As in the case of EKC, hence, a transition
problem  arises,  that  should  be  addressed  by  proper  policies,  and  should  not  be
overlooked.
In other words, absent EKC in the foreseeable future humanity will  face a tradeoff
between economic growth  in a warmer world, or  economic  stagnation  in a  cooler
world. The choice between these two alternatives is not just an economical one, as it
implies a number of ethical arguments  regarding,  for example,  to what extent  the
human  genre  has  a  right  to  interfere  with  the  environment  and,  even  more
fundamentally, what are  the rights of  the  future generations, as well as what  is  in
their best interest. The moral side of the issue derives from the fact that we know that
the  current  economic  framework  is  incompatible  with  “sustainability”  strictly
defined,  as many  environmentalists  have  argues  (see  for  example WWF  2008). A
previous version of  the same report  (WWF 2006, p.19) went as  far as  to claim that
“No region, nor the world as a whole, met both criteria for sustainable development.
Cuba  alone  did”. While  a  similarly  explicit  statement  can’t  be  found  in  the most
recent edition of the Leaving Planet Report, the result is pretty much the same. It is
worth being emphasized that this is not the result of a selective interpretation of the
reality  or  of  a  poor methodology,  but  the  logical  consequence  of  a  definition  of
“sustainable  development”  as  basically  a  lack  of  interference  with  the  natural
environment, which is consistent with much of the environmental movements as well






willingness  to  invest,  and  possibility  of  creating  a  better  world  for  the  future




under  the  former,  the  environment  can’t  be  saved  without  giving  up  economic
growth,  or  it  can  be  saved  only  to  the  extent  that  economic  growth  is  given  up.
Significantly enough, most estimate on the costs and benefits of global warming and
climate policies find comparable result for the two sides. The main reasons why most
economists  seem  to believe  that action  is needed have  to do with a precautionary
approach (Morris 2000) and/or an over‑simplified vision of the underlying scientific
issues (Henderson 2009).
In  the  EKC‑case,  instead,  the  environment  can  and will  be  saved,  but  for  this  to
happen, the world’s economy will have to grow enough. Wealthier countries do or





as  they make  faster  the  innovation process and/or  the  technological  improvement,
especially in the developing world.
If  things are  like  this,  the  two cases hereby considered are  clearly  symmetrical:  in
both  cases,  there  is  short‑  and  long‑run  tradeoff  between  reducing  emissions  and
keeping  growth.  Hence,  there  is  an  intimate  relationship  between  the  world’s
economic performance and its environmental future.
Now,  let’s  consider  global  warming  as  conventional  pollution  (which  it  is  not,
because  temperature  increase  per  se  is  not  linked with  human  or  environmental












to  adopt  cleaner  technologies.  Often,  however,  the  costs  of  the  underlying
transactions  are  too  high,  so  it  may  be  decided  that  the  state  subsidizes  cleaner
technologies, that is, the burden is shifted onto tax payers (who may roughly coincide
with the polluted party). Alas, “not all diseconomies can be eliminated. Too many
vehicles  in  the  streets  generate diseconomies  to  the  other  vehicles. Urban growth
increases  the value of  land  and generates monetary,  external diseconomies  to  the
other  users.  Noise  and  part  of  the  atmospheric  pollution  from  productive  and
commercial  activities  can’t  be  eliminated,  but  only  reduced.  The  costs  of  external
diseconomies  in congested areas will  increase not  just  for  individuals, but also  for
businesses. Not always this will reduce their demand for those areas, because there
are also ‘external economies’ generated by the existing businesses. The market, if left
alone,  will  stop  ‘new  entries’  only  when  they  will  stop  producing  differential
benefits”.
There is a clear analogy. Emissions can’t be eliminated without giving up the world





hand  in  hand  except  for  a  small  number  of  highly developed  countries, with  the
external diseconomy.
The  current  global  markets  may  underprice  carbon.  As  a  consequence  of  this,










same  effect  of  carbon  pricing,  as  it  disincentives  the  use  of  fossil  energy.  In  fact,
carbon  is  indirectly priced at  least  in  four different ways,  some of which are  truly
global  by  nature.  First,  energy  taxation.  In  the European Union,  for  example,  the
country that taxes gasoline and diesel the least was Cyprus, that in the first 10 months
of  2008  had  an  average  taxation  of  0.445  and  0.399  euro per  liter  of  gasoline  and
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others  tax  it more  than proportionally. A  large part of world energy consumption
happens in countries where the amount of energy taxes exceeds the amount of energy
subsidies (see data from WB 2008). Petroleum, for example,  is taxed in many ways
and  in  many  jurisdictions,  and  it  is  likely  that,  for  example,  the  consumption
reductions due to the taxation of the oil companies’ revenues in the oil‑rich countries





Thirdly,  the amount of oil and gas  that  is produced every year,  is probably  lower
than the amount that would be produced in a perfect market, as a consequence of the
numerous political restrictions, cartels (such as OPEC), etc.
Fourthly,  most  developed  countries  and  an  increasing  number  of  developing


















to a  trend reversal;  (d)  if  the EKC hypothesis  is  true, and  if  the political goal  is  to
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generations  requires  to  consume  less  energy  (that  is,  to  pay  more  for  the  same
amount of energy) and hence grow more slowly. This slower growth will result  in
lower  capital  accumulation,  less  wealth,  and  arguably  less  technological
improvement  for  the  future  generations,  who  will  be  impoverished  by  climate
policies, and not just by the amount of unmitigated global warming.1
In other words,  future generations will  face climate costs whatever choice  is made
today and whatever is the real state of the world and scientific truth. Table 2 shows
the distribution of  costs  in  simplified scenarios, depending on  the science and  the
policy of global warming.
















1A.  Less  warming,  less
wealth
1B.  Less  warming,  less
wealth
Weak  or  no  climate
policies are implemented
1B.  More  warming,  more
wealth




















rich will  be  poorer  despite  the  subsidy,  because  they might  be  living  in  a  cooler
world, but they will also have had a lower rate of economic growth and presumably
a lower capital accumulation.
Third,  while  it  may  be  true  that  global  warming  is  a  global  public  bad  whose
abatement is costly, it is equally true that economic growth is a public good whose
production  is  costly,  at  least  in  terms  of  higher  carbon  concentrations  in  the
atmosphere. At the present state of scientific knowledge, little can be said regarding
the actual effects of global warming or the effects of mitigation policies, but we know
that  the marginal  greenhouse  effect  of  GHGs molecules will  be  decreasing.  This
suggests that the decision to make strong climate policies might be shifted sometime
in  the  future,  without  losing  much  in  terms  of  slower  temperature  increase.
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Consistently, most climate economists (for example Nordhaus 2008), albeit favorable
to  implementing  climate  policies,  suggest  that  a moderate  action  is  taken,  not  a
radical one, with increasing intensity over time.
Hence,  a  prima  facie  case  can  be made  for  shifting  the  cost  of  pollution  onto  the
polluted party, i.e. on future generations, because on the one hand there seems to be
still  time  enough  to  make  policy  changes  as  the  evidence  on  the  scientific  facts
becomes more  (or  less)  compelling,2 on the other hand the external diseconomy
(global  warming)  apparently  goes  hand  in  hand  with  the  external  economy
(economic  growth).  In  this  perspective,  anthropogenic  global warming  is  neither
distorsive nor a market failure; it is rather part of the big picture.





forest‑owner might  end  up with  not  taking  care  of  the  forest  itself.  This  lack  of
attention might lead to higher social costs.
In the case of global warming, of course, the polluted party has no choice regarding
how to behave, as  they will  just  inherit  the world as we  leave  it. However, moral
hazard still exists.
Policies are often assumed to work properly. However, a great amount of literature
has  focused on  the extent  to which “government  failures”,  that  can be  cause by a
variety of reasons such as inefficient implementation of pressure groups, can be as
much  harmful  as market  failures  (see,  for  example,  Buchanan  and  Tullock  2004,
Tullock et al. 2002, and more specifically on climate change, Yandle 1998). Beyond
that,  which  turns  almost  every  estimate  of  the  benefits  of  a  policy  into  an




famously  argued  that  mandatory  seat  belts  didn’t  reduce  highway  deaths.  An
application  of  the  Peltzman  effect,  which  has  directly  to  do with  environmental
issues, is the perverse consequences of the Endangered Species Act (ESA), a US law
that  aims  at  protecting wildlife  that  faces  extinction.  Peltzman  (2007,  pp.194‑196)
showed that ESA creates an incentive for immediate tree‑cutting in order to prevent
endangered  species  to move  onto  new pieces  of  land,  otherwise  ESA  regulations
would enter in force (see also Lueck and Michael 2003 and Margolis et al. 2007). A
wide amount of literature discusses whether or not regulation may have an adverse






To  find  moral  hazard  within  the  global  warming  debate,  one  should  better




justified  on  economic  grounds.  Since  global  warming  is  a  very  long‑term
phenomenon, one needs to understand what future costs will look like, and to solve
the very complex question about discount  rates,  for example  in  the way  the Stern
Review does (that is, by picking a close‑to‑zero discount rate) or in the way Nordhaus
(2008) does (that is, by picking a higher discount rate). Even more challenging than
picking  the “right” discount  rate,  is how  to address  the distant  future. As Adams
(2001, p.175) recalls, “300 years ago the US dollar did not exist and most of the North
American  continent was  still  owned by  the  Indians. One way of  appreciating  the
magnitude  of  the  task  that  the  greenhouse  economists  have  set  themselves  is  to
imagine them transported by time machine back to 1693, and set the task of doing a









climate  policies, most  notably  the  IPCC  (2007),  propose  that  both  adaptation  and





tradeoff  is  related  to  the  outcome  of  the  policies.  There  is,  in  fact,  an  inverse













environment  with  periodic  extremes  would  correspond  to  a  situation  where
uncertainties  are  large… while  the  condition of  steady, unvarying  stability would
correspond  to  a  situation  of  low  uncertainty  about  the  future…  Thus,  under
considerable uncertainty, resilience is the preferable strategy”. This approach seems
to fit very well with the characteristics of global warming, a threat which is defined
by  the  large amount and scope of uncertainties,  rather  than by a  reasonably good
knowledge of causal relationships and the future weather patterns.





outcome  will  be  and  perhaps  even  what  probability  is  attached  to  any  possible
outcome.  Mitigation  efforts  are  made  even  more  complicated  by  the  large
uncertainties underlying the probability of a global participation to GHGs cuts, the








all  future warming, at  least because of  the  inertial component of climate dynamics
(i.e.,  some  future warming will  happen  as  a  consequence  of  today’s  atmospheric
concentrations of GHGs) and, even more important, the natural component of global
warming. Nevertheless, it is most useful to operate a theoretical distinction between
the  two  policies,  in  order  to  better  understand  both  the  respective  “doses”  and
“timings”.
As it has been already recalled, some authors – such as Goklany (2000) and Okonski
(2003)  –  have  emphasized  that  adaptation  is  more  economically  efficient  than
mitigation because it focuses on real problems, not on uncertain ones. Moreover, it
allows  to  tackle problems  that may be  exacerbated,  rather  than  caused,  by global
warming,  such as  the diffusion of  tropical diseases and  the  lack of access  to clear,
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drinking  water  in  the  developing  world.  Finally,  adaptation  has  been  usually
underestimated (Mendelsohn 1999), as, for example, it has often been assumed that
no  health  response  would  be  taken  against  rising  malaria.  On  the  contrary,
adaptation efforts are likely to produce significant results in terms of mitigating the
effects,  rather  than  the  presumed  cause,  of  global  warming  (Mendelsohn  and
Neumann 1999).
As  compared with mitigation,  adaptation  is  relatively  less  exposed  to  the  risk  of
moral hazard. Every adaptive measure  is  inherently more  transparent,  in  the  first




has  emerged  clearly with  the  so  called Clean Development Mechanisms  (CDMs)
under  the Kyoto Protocol,  that generate  carbon  credits  in  regulated markets  from
investments  in  the developing,  less  carbon‑efficient world. By  insisting on energy
sources that are well beyond even Western standards, CDMs generated a fair amount
of  investments, but could do little to address what is the main source of pollution,




By  the  same  token,  under  a  lower degree  of  uncertainty,  rent  seeking  activities  –
while still existent – would be less ambitious, because the time would come when a

















assess  (a)  the  real  magnitude  and  scope  of  scientific  uncertainties,  and  (b)  the
reciprocal nature of global warming,  that  can be seen as a byproduct of economic
growth. If these two questions are properly set, one will realize that the effectiveness
–  leave  aside  efficiency  –  of  the  proposed  policies may  be  lower  than  expected.






to  be  underlying  the  policies  implementation,  this may well  be  a  case when  it  is
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the  freedom  of  businesses  and  individuals  to  invest,  operate,  trade,  and  of  the
stability  of  the  legal  framework.  Economic  freedom  is measured  by  the Heritage





number of private vehicles,  etc. The dataset  refers  to  162  countries  for  the period






relation  between  the  institutional  factors  subsumed  in  the  Index  of  Economic












has  passed  a  plan  to  achieve  a major  cut  by  20%  by  2020.  The  newly  elected US
President,  Barack Obama,  has  also  committed  himself with  the  goal  of  reducing
emissions. At a global level, talks are still in process to reach a post‑Kyoto agreement,
which  might  emerge  as  early  as  late  2009  in  Copenhagen.  There  seems  to  be,
however, a sort of divide as far as GHGs policies are concerned: while the developed
world – which  is  relatively  less populated,  less  carbon‑intensive,  and with higher
levels  of  emissions  per  capita  –  is  designing policies  in  order  to move  towards  a
carbon‑free world,  the developing world  seems  less  involved  in  the process. Two
major reasons are often raised for this: (1) developed world is historically responsible
for the observed, anthropogenic global warming, so it should take action in the first
place;  (2)  economic growth  is more  important  than  the  environment,  in  countries
with low per capita income which still suffer for poverty. Underlying this criticism, is
the assumption that climate policies are not cost‑free. That criticism should be taken




























An  increase  in  population,  GDP  per  capita,  energy  intensity,  or  carbon  intensity




Several  authors  have,  in  fact,  suggested  that  the world  is  overpopulated  (see,  for
example, Ehrlich 1968; Ehrlich and Ehrlich 2008; Meadows et al. 1972; Meadows et al.
2004). Beyond the intellectual criticism to the overpopulation argument (for example
Hayek  1988;  Simon 1996; Eberstadt  2007),  the  issue of population  control  raises  a
number of moral as well as economic problems that won’t be addressed in this paper.














of  an  economy, while  carbon  intensity  of  energy  expresses  the  amount  of  carbon
emissions3 that is generated by burning fossil fuels. The two concepts may be unified












While  it may be analytically useful  to distinguish between energy  intensity of  the
economy  and  carbon  intensity  of  energy,  to  the  purpose  of  this  paper  it  is  also
sufficient  to  focus  on  carbon  intensity  of  the  GDP  (from  now  on,  just  carbon
intensity). Moreover,  carbon  intensity of  the economy also  includes  some piece of










population  and GDP will  drive up  emissions, while  carbon  intensity will  drive  it
down. World carbon emissions have grown so far both in the world as a whole, and
in most subsets of countries (most notably, both in OECD and non‑OECD countries).
That  suggests  that  GDP  and  population  growth  have  offset  the  gains  in  carbon
intensity, as well as  in energy content of GDP and carbon content of energy taken
individually. Notwithstanding, the observed dynamics suggests that a policy priority
should be placed  in accelerating  the  trend  in carbon  intensity  reductions –  that  is,
doing the same (or more) with less and cleaner energy – rather than in decelerating
population  or  GDP  growth.  Carbon  intensity  can  also  be  viewed  as  a  proxy  for
technical progress: in fact, the reduction in carbon intensity has not been driven so far








order  of  magnitude  as  well  as  trend  when  it  comes  to  per  capita  emissions.  In

































very  interesting  elements  emerge.  Firstly,  only  Germany was  able  to maintain  a
consistent quota of per capita emissions reduction (‑5%), followed by the USA (‑1%),
while  the United Kingdom  stayed basically  at  the  same  level. All  other  countries
increased their emissions, with Italy and China by 10% and 65% respectively,  thus











environmental  goals:  the  introduction of  nuclear  energy  in  France  for  the  sake  of














“Environmental Kuznets  Curves”  (EKCs),  named  after  the Nobel‑laureate  Simon
Kuznet’s  seminal work on average  income and  income  inequality  (Kuznets  1955).
Kuznets found that, as average income grows, social inequalities grow up to a point,
after which  they  start  to decline. A  similar  bell‑shaped  curve  (Figure  3)  has  been
found for a number of pollutants.
Figure 5. Environmental Kuznets Curve.
The  EKC  basically  shows  that  economic  development  produces  an  increase  in














are also more efficient, and therefore  it  is  logical  that  they are obtained as soon as
they  are  affordable.  It  is  a  consequence  of  the  fact  that  a  richer  society  has more
available resources  to either spend or  invest  in  the environment.  In conclusion, an
increase  in  wealth  may  cause  an  environmental  problem,  but  under  the  EKC
hypothesis it may also solve it.
Shafik and Bandyopadhyay (1992) looked at eight different environmental indicators,
and  found  that  “many  indicators  tend  to  improve  as  countries  approach middle‑
income  levels”.  Selden and Song  (1994)  found an  inverted‑U curve  for  suspended
particulate matter, sulfur dioxide, oxides of nitrogen, and carbon monoxide, although
they  concluded  that  the  trend‑inversion  would  show  up  in  the  very  long  run.
Grossman  and Krueger  (1995)  examined  four  types  of  environmental  indicator  –
concentrations of urban air pollution; measures of the state of the oxygen regime in
river basins; concentrations of fecal contaminants in river basins; and concentrations
of  heavy metals  in  river  basins  –  finding  that  “economic  growth brings  an  initial
phase of deterioration followed by a subsequent phase of improvement”. Carson et
al.  (1997)  focused  on  the  50 US  States  and  found  evidence  of  the  EKC  for  seven
different types of pollutants.
Table 2 shows the results of some studies regarding the existence of EKCs and the per




























but  just  for very high  income  levels,  that will occur only  in  the  long run  for most
developing countries. Aslanidis and  Iranzo  (2009)  found no evidence  for a  carbon
EKC,  but  highlighted  that  “we  found  two  regimes,  namely  a  low‑income  regime





feedbacks  from  the  state  of  environment.  On  the  contrary,  they  claim  that
environmental  deterioration may  have  a  negative  impact  on  economic  growth  as
well. Stern et al. (1996) also suggested that the EKC may just be capturing an effect of


















wealthier  community  can  afford  cleaner, more  costly  technologies  and  (e)  as  the


















continual  quest  to  improve  its  quality  of  life, which  is  determined  by  numerous
social, economic, and environmental factors. The weight given to each determinant is
constantly  changing with  society’s  precise  circumstances  and  perceptions.  In  the
54






in  those  early  stages,  society  may,  in  fact,  be  unaware  of  the  risk  posed  by  a
deterioration  in  the  specific  environmental  impact,  measured  by  the  particular
indicator in question. However, as society becomes wealthier; tackles these problems;
and,  possibly,  gains  more  knowledge  about  the  social,  health,  and  economic
consequences of the environmental impact in question, reducing the environmental
impact due to the specific indicator automatically rises higher on its priority list”.
The  focus  on  institutional  factors  (broadly defined  following  Sala‑i‑Martin  2002),4
rather than on the mere levels of GDP, led other economists to try and link carbon








Montgomery  and  Bate  (2005)  found  a  significant  negative  correlation  between




(p.143).  Among  the  others,  they  suggest  that  economic  freedom  is  positively
correlated with GDP growth, and through GDP growth it affects emissions, as well (a
re‑interpretation of EKC). Moreover, they suggest that freer countries tend to better













these authors  the main effect of  economic  freedom on carbon  intensity  is  through
technology transfer,  that mostly applies  to developing countries, and the ability  to
adopt cleaner technologies.
Carlsson  and Lundström  (2003)  found  that  an  increase  in  economic  freedom,  and
more precisely an increase in specific subcomponents of economic freedom, may be
negatively  correlated  with  carbon  emissions.  That  particularly  applies  to  price
stability and legal stability. The result appears to be more robust for countries with a
relatively  lower  industrial  sector  as  a  share  of  GDP.  Other  subcomponents  of
economic freedom, such as freedom to trade, or measures of other freedoms, such as
political freedom, are little or no significant at all. Three main reasons are provided
for  this:  (a)  an  efficiency  effect,  i.e.  competitive  pressures  create  an  incentive  for
businesses to invest in more efficient, less energy‑intensive technologies; (b) a trade
regulation effect, under which a more efficient resource allocation is expected to take
place;  (c)  a  stability  effect,  concerning  of  the  higher  level  of  investments  that  can
result from a greater price stability.
On a different level, Cornillie and Fankhauser (2002) showed that a market‑oriented
regulation  has  contributed  to  the  reduction  of  energy  intensity  in  the  Eastern
European transition countries. He and Wang (2007) found a similar result for China,
where  economic  liberalizations  are  negatively  correlated  with  energy  intensity.




This paper will  investigate  the  correlation between economic  freedom and carbon
emissions.
Economic freedom means the freedom of market actors to make use of the various
production  factors  they  deem most  efficient,  based  on  a  reliable  and  stable  legal
framework, without being subjected to state interference. Various attempts have been
made to measure economic freedom. This paper refers to the index drawn up by the
Heritage  Foundation  and  the Wall  Street  Journal  (Miller  2009).  According  to  the
authors:  “The  highest  form  of  economic  freedom  provides  an  absolute  right  of







the  average  of  ten  components,  each  of whom  is  also  the  result  of  the weighted
average of other subcomponents. A more detailed description of  the methodology
employed by the Heritage Foundaion is available online at www.heritage.org/index.
Below,  some qualitative details  are provided  for  the  ten  components  of  economic














that  affects  imports  and  exports  of  good  and  services”.  Being  a  proxy  for
protectionism,  trade  freedom might have an  impact on carbon  intensity, by either
protecting  energy‑intensive  companies  (hence  creating  a  lower  incentive  for
technological  improvement)  or  by  protecting  national  champions  in  non‑energy
intensive  sectors  (which  would,  all  else  being  equal,  determine  a  lower  carbon
intensity). Therefore, while trade freedom may have an impact on carbon intensity,
but  the  sign  of  the  effect  is  likely  to  depend  on  exogenous  variables,  such  as  the
composition of the economy, rather than the score of trade freedom itself. Moreover,
some economists have  argued  that  the  increase  in  international  trade,  that would
result  from more  trade  freedom, may  reduce  carbon  emissions  in  the  developed
                                                           
5 http://www.heritage.org/research/features/index/faq.cfm
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Likewise  trade  freedom,  fiscal  freedom  is  likely  to  have  an  impact  on  carbon










carbon  intensity:  in  fact,  the  level  of  carbon  intensity may  depend  on what’s  the
government  spends  upon. However,  it may  be  argued  that  government  size  is  a





i.e., when  the  government  size  grows,  carbon  intensity  grows  as well. However,
government size  is defined  in a way  that 100% equals  to  the smallest government




controls.  Both  inflation  and  price  controls  distort  market  activity.  Price  stability
58
without microeconomic intervention is ideal state for free market”. Price stability and
absence  of  price  controls  are  also  two key  variables  for  the willingness  to  invest,
especially in capital‑intensive businesses (Kim and Wu 1993) such as the power sector
and most energy‑intensive sectors.  It  is  likely  that monetary freedom is negatively
correlated with carbon intensity.
Investment freedom
Investment  freedom  “scrutinizes  each  country’s  policies  towards  the  free  flow  of
investment capital (foreign investment as well as internal capital flows) in order to
determine  its  overall  investment  climate”.  Investments  are  a  key  feature  for
technological innovation, that, in the long run, is a major driver for carbon intensity
reductions  (Bernstein  et  al.  2006).  It  is  likely  that  a  negative  correlation  exists,
between investment freedom and carbon intensity.
Financial freedom
Financial  freedom  is  “a  measure  of  banking  security  as  well  as  measure  of















Freedom  from  corruption  is  based upon Transparency  International’s Corruption
Perception  Index,  and  is  based  upon  the  assumption  that  “corruption  erodes










The goal of  this paper  is  to  check whether  a  correlation exists,  between economic








allows  to overcome a number of difficulties  that have  so  far prevented a positive
outcome from international negotiations (Pizer 2005).









defined); GDP = Gross Domestic Product  (US$2000); Pop = Population; En  =  total
primary energy use (tons of oil equivalent); Ind = industry sector as a share of GDP;
Veh = number of private vehicles; EnImp =  energy  imports  as  a  share of primary
energy use; Urb = urban areas as a  share of  the  total  surface of a country; Nuke =
nuclear  energy  as  a  share  of  total  primary  energy  consumption;  u  represents
statistical error.






much  interdependent.  In  fact,  both  GDP  and  carbon  intensity may  depend  on  a
number of variables such as institutional factors, population, the composition of the




the ratio between carbon emissions and GDP appears  to have  little  to do with  the











The  number  of  circulating  vehicles,  as  a  proxy  for  the  people’s mobility,  can  be
expected to be positively correlated with carbon intensity.
Nuclear power has been considered separately from other sources of energy because




















the Heritage  Foundation’s website  (http://www.heritage.org/index). All  the other








Figure  6.  Economic  freedom  vs.  Carbon  intensity.  Source:  own  elaboration  on
Miller (2009), WDI 2008.
Figure  6  provides  an  insight  of  what  has  been  investigated.  On  the  left  side
(economically unfree countries) both countries with very high and very low carbon
intensities  can  be  found.  The  latter  are  very  poor  countries,  whose  low  energy
intensity  is  quite  a  proxy  for  energy  poverty  (under  the  Environmental Kuznets
Curve hypothesis,  these  countries would be on  the extreme  left  as well). Then,  as
economic  freedom grows,  carbon  intensity  covers  a wide  range of values, but  the




A first  regression has been  run with a pooled OLS,  in order  to  check whether  the
correlation may exist. A quadratic  term  for  economic  freedom and GDP has been




. regress intensity freedom sqfreed gdp_2 sqgdp_2 urban vehicles nuclear_energy import
> s population industry energy_use
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     735
-------------+------------------------------           F( 11,   723) =   39.04
       Model |  9.2774e-10    11  8.4340e-11           Prob > F      =  0.0000
    Residual |  1.5618e-09   723  2.1601e-12           R-squared     =  0.3727
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.3631
       Total |  2.4895e-09   734  3.3917e-12           Root MSE      =  1.5e-06
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
   intensity |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
     freedom |  -2.02e-07   4.27e-08    -4.74   0.000    -2.86e-07   -1.18e-07
   sqfreedom |   8.37e-10   3.50e-10     2.39   0.017     1.50e-10    1.52e-09
    gdp_2000 |  -3.48e-19   1.62e-19    -2.15   0.032    -6.67e-19   -2.98e-20
     sqgdp_2 |   4.16e-32   1.70e-32     2.44   0.015     8.19e-33    7.51e-32
       urban |   1.79e-08   4.31e-09     4.16   0.000     9.45e-09    2.64e-08
    vehicles |  -2.98e-09   5.23e-10    -5.69   0.000    -4.00e-09   -1.95e-09
nuclear_en~y |   3.75e-09   3.37e-09     1.11   0.267    -2.88e-09    1.04e-08
     imports |   2.14e-09   4.14e-10     5.16   0.000     1.32e-09    2.95e-09
  population |   5.53e-16   3.61e-16     1.53   0.127    -1.57e-16    1.26e-15
    industry |   3.48e-08   7.27e-09     4.79   0.000     2.05e-08    4.91e-08
  energy_use |   2.50e-10   4.55e-11     5.51   0.000     1.61e-10    3.40e-10
       _cons |   8.55e-06   1.35e-06     6.35   0.000     5.91e-06    .0000112
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
As  expected,  both  economic  freedom  and  square  economic  freedom  appear
significant at a 5% level. The sign of economic freedom is negative, indicating that the
correlation is negative. Interestingly enough, the sign is negative for GDP as well. All








. xtreg intensity freedom sqfreed gdp_2 sqgdp_2 urban vehicles nuclear_energy imports
> population industry energy_use, fe
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       735
Group variable: id_country                      Number of groups   =       114
R-sq:  within  = 0.3951                         Obs per group: min =         1
       between = 0.0883                                        avg =       6.4
       overall = 0.0955                                        max =        11
                                                F(11,610)          =     36.23
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.4443                        Prob > F           =    0.0000
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
   intensity |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
     freedom |  -2.48e-07   2.25e-08   -11.06   0.000    -2.92e-07   -2.04e-07
   sqfreedom |   1.74e-09   1.96e-10     8.86   0.000     1.35e-09    2.12e-09
    gdp_2000 |  -9.67e-19   3.69e-19    -2.62   0.009    -1.69e-18   -2.43e-19
     sqgdp_2 |   4.55e-32   1.97e-32     2.30   0.022     6.68e-33    8.42e-32
       urban |   1.69e-08   1.25e-08     1.35   0.177    -7.63e-09    4.13e-08
    vehicles |  -2.29e-09   5.13e-10    -4.45   0.000    -3.29e-09   -1.28e-09
nuclear_en~y |  -3.98e-08   8.69e-09    -4.58   0.000    -5.69e-08   -2.27e-08
     imports |   2.75e-09   1.02e-09     2.70   0.007     7.50e-10    4.75e-09
  population |   1.45e-15   2.52e-15     0.58   0.565    -3.49e-15    6.39e-15
    industry |   1.24e-08   6.16e-09     2.02   0.044     3.43e-10    2.45e-08
  energy_use |   1.35e-10   6.57e-11     2.05   0.040     5.90e-12    2.64e-10
       _cons |   9.37e-06   9.57e-07     9.79   0.000     7.49e-06    .0000112
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
     sigma_u |  1.748e-06
     sigma_e |  3.208e-07
         rho |  .96741251   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
F test that all u_i=0:     F(113, 610) =   128.91            Prob > F = 0.0000
The results is fully consistent with the former regression.
In order to test the robustness of the model, a cubic term for economic freedom has




. xtreg intensity freedom sqfreed cubfreed  gdp_2 sqgdp_2 urban vehicles nuclear_energ
> y imports population industry energy_use, fe
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       735
Group variable: id_country                      Number of groups   =       114
R-sq:  within  = 0.4004                         Obs per group: min =         1
       between = 0.0899                                        avg =       6.4
       overall = 0.0983                                        max =        11
                                                F(12,609)          =     33.89
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.4179                        Prob > F           =    0.0000
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
   intensity |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
     freedom |  -4.92e-07   1.08e-07    -4.56   0.000    -7.03e-07   -2.80e-07
   sqfreedom |   6.16e-09   1.93e-09     3.20   0.001     2.37e-09    9.94e-09
    cubfreed |  -2.59e-11   1.12e-11    -2.31   0.021    -4.79e-11   -3.84e-12
    gdp_2000 |  -9.53e-19   3.67e-19    -2.60   0.010    -1.67e-18   -2.32e-19
     sqgdp_2 |   4.65e-32   1.97e-32     2.36   0.018     7.86e-33    8.51e-32
       urban |   1.54e-08   1.24e-08     1.24   0.215    -8.98e-09    3.99e-08
    vehicles |  -2.28e-09   5.12e-10    -4.46   0.000    -3.28e-09   -1.27e-09
nuclear_en~y |  -3.96e-08   8.66e-09    -4.57   0.000    -5.66e-08   -2.26e-08
     imports |   2.55e-09   1.02e-09     2.50   0.013     5.50e-10    4.55e-09
  population |   1.35e-15   2.51e-15     0.54   0.590    -3.57e-15    6.27e-15
    industry |   1.26e-08   6.14e-09     2.05   0.041     5.26e-10    2.46e-08
  energy_use |   1.58e-10   6.63e-11     2.39   0.017     2.82e-11    2.88e-10
       _cons |   .0000137   2.10e-06     6.51   0.000     9.56e-06    .0000178
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
     sigma_u |  1.729e-06
     sigma_e |  3.197e-07
         rho |  .96695281   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------




. xtreg intensity freedom sqfreed gdp_2 sqgdp_2 urban imports population industry, fe
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =      1227
Group variable: id_country                      Number of groups   =       123
R-sq:  within  = 0.1798                         Obs per group: min =         1
       between = 0.1264                                        avg =      10.0
       overall = 0.1235                                        max =        11
                                                F(8,1096)          =     30.03
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.1993                        Prob > F           =    0.0000
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
   intensity |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
     freedom |  -1.51e-07   1.69e-08    -8.94   0.000    -1.85e-07   -1.18e-07
   sqfreedom |   1.02e-09   1.49e-10     6.83   0.000     7.26e-10    1.31e-09
    gdp_2000 |  -1.30e-18   3.34e-19    -3.88   0.000    -1.95e-18   -6.41e-19
     sqgdp_2 |   6.53e-32   1.83e-32     3.56   0.000     2.93e-32    1.01e-31
       urban |  -6.39e-10   8.04e-09    -0.08   0.937    -1.64e-08    1.51e-08
     imports |   7.52e-10   2.49e-10     3.02   0.003     2.64e-10    1.24e-09
  population |   2.92e-15   2.04e-15     1.43   0.153    -1.09e-15    6.93e-15
    industry |   5.14e-09   3.50e-09     1.47   0.142    -1.72e-09    1.20e-08
       _cons |   6.80e-06   6.33e-07    10.74   0.000     5.56e-06    8.04e-06
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
     sigma_u |  1.875e-06
     sigma_e |  3.437e-07
         rho |  .96747293   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
F test that all u_i=0:     F(122, 1096) =   190.45           Prob > F = 0.0000
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(R.5)
. xtreg intensity freedom sqfreed gdp_2 sqgdp_2 vehicles imports nuclear_energy employ
> ment_industry , fe
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       622
Group variable: id_country                      Number of groups   =       100
R-sq:  within  = 0.4806                         Obs per group: min =         1
       between = 0.0573                                        avg =       6.2
       overall = 0.0705                                        max =        11
                                                F(8,514)           =     59.44
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.5290                        Prob > F           =    0.0000
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
   intensity |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
     freedom |  -3.21e-07   2.26e-08   -14.22   0.000    -3.65e-07   -2.77e-07
   sqfreedom |   2.31e-09   1.90e-10    12.15   0.000     1.94e-09    2.69e-09
    gdp_2000 |  -1.05e-18   3.88e-19    -2.71   0.007    -1.81e-18   -2.90e-19
     sqgdp_2 |   5.05e-32   2.12e-32     2.38   0.018     8.80e-33    9.21e-32
    vehicles |  -1.49e-09   3.96e-10    -3.77   0.000    -2.27e-09   -7.15e-10
     imports |   2.75e-09   1.07e-09     2.58   0.010     6.54e-10    4.85e-09
nuclear_en~y |  -3.79e-08   7.63e-09    -4.97   0.000    -5.29e-08   -2.29e-08
employment~y |   6.86e-09   6.28e-09     1.09   0.275    -5.47e-09    1.92e-08
       _cons |   .0000132   7.14e-07    18.46   0.000     .0000118    .0000146
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
     sigma_u |  1.888e-06
     sigma_e |  2.775e-07
         rho |  .97885721   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
F test that all u_i=0:     F(99, 514) =   160.08             Prob > F = 0.0000
After this first test was passed, a subindex has been defined as the average of four








. xtreg intensity subind sqsub gdp_2 sqgdp_2 urban vehicles nuclear_energy imports pop
> ulation industry energy_use, fe
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       735
Group variable: id_country                      Number of groups   =       114
R-sq:  within  = 0.4779                         Obs per group: min =         1
       between = 0.0485                                        avg =       6.4
       overall = 0.0547                                        max =        11
                                                F(11,610)          =     50.77
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.4362                        Prob > F           =    0.0000
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
   intensity |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
    subindex |  -2.07e-07   1.38e-08   -15.06   0.000    -2.34e-07   -1.80e-07
       sqsub |   1.52e-09   1.24e-10    12.30   0.000     1.28e-09    1.77e-09
    gdp_2000 |  -6.63e-19   3.43e-19    -1.94   0.053    -1.34e-18    9.65e-21
     sqgdp_2 |   3.29e-32   1.83e-32     1.80   0.073    -3.07e-33    6.88e-32
       urban |   1.51e-08   1.17e-08     1.30   0.195    -7.79e-09    3.80e-08
    vehicles |  -1.93e-09   4.75e-10    -4.06   0.000    -2.86e-09   -9.97e-10
nuclear_en~y |  -3.21e-08   8.08e-09    -3.97   0.000    -4.80e-08   -1.62e-08
     imports |   2.17e-09   9.48e-10     2.29   0.022     3.09e-10    4.03e-09
  population |  -2.78e-15   2.34e-15    -1.19   0.235    -7.37e-15    1.81e-15
    industry |   1.48e-08   5.73e-09     2.59   0.010     3.59e-09    2.61e-08
  energy_use |   1.09e-10   6.08e-11     1.79   0.073    -1.03e-11    2.28e-10
       _cons |   7.74e-06   7.47e-07    10.37   0.000     6.28e-06    9.21e-06
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
     sigma_u |  1.804e-06
     sigma_e |  2.980e-07
         rho |  .97342921   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
F test that all u_i=0:     F(113, 610) =   141.98            Prob > F = 0.0000
(R.7)
. xtreg intensity subinde sqsub cubsub  gdp_2 sqgdp_2 urban vehicles nuclear_energy im
> ports population industry energy_use, fe
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       735
Group variable: id_country                      Number of groups   =       114
R-sq:  within  = 0.4936                         Obs per group: min =         1
       between = 0.0498                                        avg =       6.4
       overall = 0.0637                                        max =        11
                                                F(12,609)          =     49.46
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.3903                        Prob > F           =    0.0000
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
   intensity |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
    subindex |  -4.51e-07   5.78e-08    -7.80   0.000    -5.64e-07   -3.37e-07
       sqsub |   6.13e-09   1.07e-09     5.73   0.000     4.03e-09    8.24e-09
      cubsub |  -2.79e-11   6.42e-12    -4.34   0.000    -4.05e-11   -1.52e-11
    gdp_2000 |  -6.15e-19   3.38e-19    -1.82   0.069    -1.28e-18    4.86e-20
     sqgdp_2 |   3.16e-32   1.80e-32     1.75   0.081    -3.85e-33    6.70e-32
       urban |   1.20e-08   1.15e-08     1.04   0.296    -1.06e-08    3.47e-08
    vehicles |  -1.88e-09   4.68e-10    -4.02   0.000    -2.80e-09   -9.62e-10
nuclear_en~y |  -3.01e-08   7.98e-09    -3.78   0.000    -4.58e-08   -1.45e-08
     imports |   1.85e-09   9.38e-10     1.98   0.049     1.05e-11    3.69e-09
  population |  -2.70e-15   2.30e-15    -1.17   0.243    -7.22e-15    1.83e-15
    industry |   1.74e-08   5.68e-09     3.06   0.002     6.24e-09    2.85e-08
  energy_use |   1.28e-10   6.01e-11     2.13   0.034     9.77e-12    2.46e-10
       _cons |   .0000118   1.19e-06     9.90   0.000     9.48e-06    .0000142
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
     sigma_u |  1.801e-06
     sigma_e |  2.938e-07
         rho |  .97409144   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------






. xtreg lnintens lnfreed lngdp urban vehicles nuclear_energy imports population indust
> ry energy_use, fe
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       735
Group variable: id_country                      Number of groups   =       114
R-sq:  within  = 0.5492                         Obs per group: min =         1
       between = 0.0751                                        avg =       6.4
       overall = 0.1114                                        max =        11
                                                F(9,612)           =     82.85
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.7405                        Prob > F           =    0.0000
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    lnintens |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
     lnfreed |  -.1082467   .0658146    -1.64   0.101    -.2374966    .0210032
       lngdp |  -.7537776   .0471546   -15.99   0.000     -.846382   -.6611732
       urban |   .0261885   .0038096     6.87   0.000      .018707    .0336699
    vehicles |  -.0005374   .0001488    -3.61   0.000    -.0008296   -.0002452
nuclear_en~y |  -.0053931   .0023187    -2.33   0.020    -.0099466   -.0008396
     imports |    .001462   .0002775     5.27   0.000      .000917     .002007
  population |   1.29e-09   5.65e-10     2.29   0.023     1.83e-10    2.40e-09
    industry |   .0103763   .0016672     6.22   0.000     .0071022    .0136504
  energy_use |    .000158   .0000182     8.68   0.000     .0001223    .0001937
       _cons |   2.842775   .9349811     3.04   0.002     1.006615    4.678936
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
     sigma_u |  1.2990633
     sigma_e |   .0873018
         rho |  .99550397   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
F test that all u_i=0:     F(113, 612) =   371.55            Prob > F = 0.0000
(R.9)
. xtreg lnintens freed sqfreed gdp_2  sqgdp urban vehicles nuclear_energy import
> s population industry energy_use, fe
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       735
Group variable: id_country                      Number of groups   =       114
R-sq:  within  = 0.3806                         Obs per group: min =         1
       between = 0.1584                                        avg =       6.4
       overall = 0.2063                                        max =        11
                                                F(11,610)          =     34.07
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.1918                        Prob > F           =    0.0000
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    lnintens |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
     freedom |  -.0117048    .007175    -1.63   0.103    -.0257955    .0023858
   sqfreedom |   2.63e-06   .0000626     0.04   0.966    -.0001203    .0001256
    gdp_2000 |  -4.52e-13   1.18e-13    -3.84   0.000    -6.83e-13   -2.21e-13
     sqgdp_2 |   2.00e-26   6.31e-27     3.18   0.002     7.66e-27    3.24e-26
       urban |   -.000171   .0039843    -0.04   0.966    -.0079956    .0076536
    vehicles |  -.0014124   .0001641    -8.61   0.000    -.0017345   -.0010902
nuclear_en~y |  -.0075629   .0027759    -2.72   0.007    -.0130143   -.0021114
     imports |   .0015827   .0003258     4.86   0.000     .0009429    .0022224
  population |   8.98e-10   8.04e-10     1.12   0.264    -6.80e-10    2.48e-09
    industry |    .004978   .0019674     2.53   0.012     .0011144    .0088416
  energy_use |   .0001002    .000021     4.77   0.000     .0000589    .0001414
       _cons |  -13.13527   .3058581   -42.95   0.000    -13.73594   -12.53461
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
     sigma_u |  .83276377
     sigma_e |  .10250789
         rho |  .98507412   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
F test that all u_i=0:     F(113, 610) =   268.84            Prob > F = 0.0000
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In  fact,  today’s  carbon  intensity  is  the  result of past  investments,  that may have a
relationship with past levels of economic freedom, rather than with the current levels.




. xtreg intensit L3.(subind due) gdp_2 sqgdp_2 urban vehicles nuclear_energy im
> ports population industry energy_use, fe
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       460
Group variable: id_country                      Number of groups   =        87
R-sq:  within  = 0.4063                         Obs per group: min =         1
       between = 0.0548                                        avg =       5.3
       overall = 0.0507                                        max =         8
                                                F(11,362)          =     22.52
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.3014                        Prob > F           =    0.0000
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
   intensity |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
    subindex |
         L3. |  -1.35e-07   1.27e-08   -10.65   0.000    -1.61e-07   -1.10e-07
      duesub |
         L3. |   1.02e-09   1.19e-10     8.58   0.000     7.86e-10    1.25e-09
    gdp_2000 |  -3.00e-19   4.00e-19    -0.75   0.454    -1.09e-18    4.86e-19
     sqgdp_2 |   9.73e-33   2.04e-32     0.48   0.634    -3.04e-32    4.99e-32
       urban |   2.22e-08   1.74e-08     1.27   0.204    -1.21e-08    5.65e-08
    vehicles |  -1.01e-09   5.97e-10    -1.69   0.092    -2.18e-09    1.65e-10
nuclear_en~y |  -2.51e-08   8.05e-09    -3.12   0.002    -4.09e-08   -9.27e-09
     imports |   2.15e-09   1.05e-09     2.04   0.042     7.85e-11    4.22e-09
  population |  -1.19e-15   3.26e-15    -0.36   0.716    -7.60e-15    5.23e-15
    industry |   2.14e-08   6.82e-09     3.13   0.002     7.95e-09    3.48e-08
  energy_use |  -7.45e-11   7.06e-11    -1.06   0.292    -2.13e-10    6.44e-11
       _cons |   4.60e-06   1.08e-06     4.27   0.000     2.48e-06    6.72e-06
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
     sigma_u |  1.668e-06
     sigma_e |  2.163e-07
         rho |  .98344658   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
F test that all u_i=0:     F(86, 362) =   170.02             Prob > F = 0.0000
70
(R.11)
. xtreg intensit L3.(subind due tre) gdp_2 sqgdp_2 urban vehicles nuclear_energ
> y imports population industry energy_use, fe
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       460
Group variable: id_country                      Number of groups   =        87
R-sq:  within  = 0.4434                         Obs per group: min =         1
       between = 0.0645                                        avg =       5.3
       overall = 0.0536                                        max =         8
                                                F(12,361)          =     23.96
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.2486                        Prob > F           =    0.0000
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
   intensity |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
    subindex |
         L3. |  -3.72e-07   4.98e-08    -7.47   0.000    -4.70e-07   -2.74e-07
      duesub |
         L3. |   5.58e-09   9.38e-10     5.95   0.000     3.74e-09    7.43e-09
      tresub |
         L3. |  -2.81e-11   5.73e-12    -4.90   0.000    -3.93e-11   -1.68e-11
    gdp_2000 |  -2.41e-19   3.88e-19    -0.62   0.534    -1.00e-18    5.21e-19
     sqgdp_2 |   1.06e-32   1.98e-32     0.54   0.592    -2.83e-32    4.95e-32
       urban |   1.75e-08   1.69e-08     1.03   0.303    -1.58e-08    5.08e-08
    vehicles |  -8.64e-10   5.79e-10    -1.49   0.137    -2.00e-09    2.75e-10
nuclear_en~y |  -2.83e-08   7.83e-09    -3.62   0.000    -4.37e-08   -1.29e-08
     imports |   1.76e-09   1.02e-09     1.72   0.087    -2.56e-10    3.78e-09
  population |  -1.35e-15   3.16e-15    -0.43   0.671    -7.57e-15    4.87e-15
    industry |   2.50e-08   6.65e-09     3.76   0.000     1.19e-08    3.81e-08
  energy_use |  -2.19e-11   6.93e-11    -0.32   0.753    -1.58e-10    1.14e-10
       _cons |   8.53e-06   1.32e-06     6.47   0.000     5.94e-06    .0000111
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
     sigma_u |  1.632e-06
     sigma_e |  2.098e-07
         rho |  .98374296   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------




based  upon  the  year  of  ratification  (not  just  signature)  of  the Kyoto  Protocol  for
Annex‑B  countries  (i.e.,  the  countries  that  have  formal  obligations  under  the
Protocol), assuming the Kyoto ratification provides a reliable proxy for the adoption
of climate policies. Some countries may have ratified Kyoto while not having taken








. xtreg intensity subind sqsub gdp_2 sqgdp_2 policy urban vehicles nuclear_energy imports po
> pulation industry energy_use, fe
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       735
Group variable: id_country                      Number of groups   =       114
R-sq:  within  = 0.4827                         Obs per group: min =         1
       between = 0.0405                                        avg =       6.4
       overall = 0.0446                                        max =        11
                                                F(12,609)          =     47.36
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.4228                        Prob > F           =    0.0000
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
   intensity |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
    subindex |  -2.09e-07   1.37e-08   -15.20   0.000    -2.36e-07   -1.82e-07
       sqsub |   1.54e-09   1.23e-10    12.46   0.000     1.30e-09    1.78e-09
    gdp_2000 |  -6.05e-19   3.42e-19    -1.77   0.078    -1.28e-18    6.72e-20
     sqgdp_2 |   3.02e-32   1.83e-32     1.65   0.099    -5.69e-33    6.60e-32
      policy |  -1.13e-07   4.75e-08    -2.38   0.018    -2.06e-07   -1.97e-08
       urban |   1.29e-08   1.17e-08     1.11   0.268    -9.98e-09    3.58e-08
    vehicles |  -1.42e-09   5.20e-10    -2.72   0.007    -2.44e-09   -3.94e-10
nuclear_en~y |  -3.03e-08   8.09e-09    -3.75   0.000    -4.62e-08   -1.45e-08
     imports |   2.05e-09   9.46e-10     2.17   0.030     1.95e-10    3.91e-09
  population |  -3.04e-15   2.33e-15    -1.30   0.193    -7.62e-15    1.54e-15
    industry |   1.36e-08   5.73e-09     2.37   0.018     2.34e-09    2.48e-08
  energy_use |   1.24e-10   6.09e-11     2.03   0.043     4.15e-12    2.43e-10
       _cons |   7.77e-06   7.44e-07    10.45   0.000     6.31e-06    9.23e-06
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
     sigma_u |  1.798e-06
     sigma_e |  2.969e-07
         rho |  .97345905   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
F test that all u_i=0:     F(113, 609) =   142.57            Prob > F = 0.0000
The  dummy  variable  “Policy”,  as  expected,  is  significant  with  a  negative  sign.
Nevertheless,  Economic  Freedom  (hereby measured  through  the  subindex above‑
defined) remains significant and the sign remains negative.
More controls have been  inserted, while  controlling  for  the “Policy” variable. The
new  controls  are:  foreign  direct  investments  (FDI), whose  sign  is  expected  to  be









. xtreg intensity subind sqsub gdp_2 sqgdp_2 policy  fdi population coal_energy nuclear_ener
> gy imports co2solidfuel roads vehicles urban industry state_revenue power_consumpt surface
> , fe
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       403
Group variable: id_country                      Number of groups   =        81
R-sq:  within  = 0.4879                         Obs per group: min =         1
       between = 0.0011                                        avg =       5.0
       overall = 0.0132                                        max =        10
                                                F(18,304)          =     16.09
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.9996                        Prob > F           =    0.0000
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
   intensity |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
    subindex |  -1.39e-07   1.83e-08    -7.58   0.000    -1.75e-07   -1.03e-07
       sqsub |   9.94e-10   1.62e-10     6.14   0.000     6.76e-10    1.31e-09
    gdp_2000 |  -4.99e-19   4.12e-19    -1.21   0.227    -1.31e-18    3.12e-19
     sqgdp_2 |   2.26e-32   2.56e-32     0.89   0.377    -2.77e-32    7.30e-32
      policy |  -2.36e-08   5.98e-08    -0.40   0.693    -1.41e-07    9.41e-08
         fdi |  -7.38e-10   1.15e-09    -0.64   0.521    -3.00e-09    1.52e-09
  population |  -6.05e-15   2.98e-15    -2.03   0.043    -1.19e-14   -1.82e-16
 coal_energy |   1.90e-08   7.82e-09     2.43   0.016     3.60e-09    3.44e-08
nuclear_en~y |  -2.28e-08   1.25e-08    -1.83   0.068    -4.74e-08    1.67e-09
     imports |   2.38e-09   1.11e-09     2.15   0.033     1.97e-10    4.56e-09
co2solidfuel |   1.24e-08   1.05e-08     1.19   0.236    -8.16e-09    3.30e-08
       roads |   2.14e-13   1.77e-13     1.21   0.225    -1.33e-13    5.62e-13
    vehicles |  -5.36e-10   7.12e-10    -0.75   0.452    -1.94e-09    8.65e-10
       urban |  -8.72e-09   1.82e-08    -0.48   0.632    -4.45e-08    2.70e-08
    industry |   4.78e-08   9.05e-09     5.29   0.000     3.00e-08    6.56e-08
state_reve~e |  -1.89e-08   7.88e-09    -2.39   0.017    -3.44e-08   -3.34e-09
power_cons~t |  -1.85e-12   3.55e-11    -0.05   0.959    -7.17e-11    6.80e-11
     surface |  -3.19e-11   2.68e-10    -0.12   0.905    -5.59e-10    4.95e-10
       _cons |    .000033   .0002272     0.15   0.885    -.0004141    .0004801
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
     sigma_u |  .00006504
     sigma_e |  2.642e-07
         rho |   .9999835   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------








.  xtreg intensity freed gdp_2 population energ industry policy urban vehicles nuclear_energ
> y , fe
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       735
Group variable: id_country                      Number of groups   =       114
R-sq:  within  = 0.3015                         Obs per group: min =         1
       between = 0.0381                                        avg =       6.4
       overall = 0.0478                                        max =        11
                                                F(9,612)           =     29.35
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.3861                        Prob > F           =    0.0000
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
   intensity |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
     freedom |  -5.22e-08   4.36e-09   -11.97   0.000    -6.08e-08   -4.37e-08
    gdp_2000 |  -8.02e-20   1.17e-19    -0.68   0.494    -3.10e-19    1.50e-19
  population |  -2.75e-15   2.29e-15    -1.20   0.232    -7.25e-15    1.76e-15
  energy_use |   2.40e-10   6.82e-11     3.52   0.000     1.06e-10    3.74e-10
    industry |   6.94e-09   6.53e-09     1.06   0.289    -5.89e-09    1.98e-08
      policy |  -3.54e-08   5.53e-08    -0.64   0.522    -1.44e-07    7.31e-08
       urban |   1.47e-08   1.33e-08     1.11   0.268    -1.14e-08    4.08e-08
    vehicles |  -2.08e-09   5.87e-10    -3.54   0.000    -3.23e-09   -9.25e-10
nuclear_en~y |  -4.57e-08   9.16e-09    -4.99   0.000    -6.37e-08   -2.77e-08
       _cons |   4.11e-06   7.96e-07     5.16   0.000     2.55e-06    5.67e-06
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
     sigma_u |  1.779e-06
     sigma_e |  3.442e-07
         rho |  .96394037   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
F test that all u_i=0:     F(113, 612) =   117.36            Prob > F = 0.0000
This is what happens in the same regression while not controlling for GDP:
(R.15)
.  xtreg intensity freed population energ industry policy urban vehicles nuclear_energy , fe
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       735
Group variable: id_country                      Number of groups   =       114
R-sq:  within  = 0.3009                         Obs per group: min =         1
       between = 0.0331                                        avg =       6.4
       overall = 0.0412                                        max =        11
                                                F(8,613)           =     32.98
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.3959                        Prob > F           =    0.0000
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
   intensity |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
     freedom |  -5.23e-08   4.36e-09   -11.99   0.000    -6.08e-08   -4.37e-08
  population |  -3.29e-15   2.15e-15    -1.53   0.126    -7.51e-15    9.26e-16
  energy_use |   2.38e-10   6.81e-11     3.50   0.001     1.04e-10    3.72e-10
    industry |   7.57e-09   6.47e-09     1.17   0.242    -5.13e-09    2.03e-08
      policy |  -3.71e-08   5.52e-08    -0.67   0.501    -1.46e-07    7.13e-08
       urban |   1.35e-08   1.32e-08     1.02   0.307    -1.24e-08    3.93e-08
    vehicles |  -2.06e-09   5.86e-10    -3.52   0.000    -3.21e-09   -9.13e-10
nuclear_en~y |  -4.52e-08   9.13e-09    -4.95   0.000    -6.31e-08   -2.73e-08
       _cons |   4.17e-06   7.90e-07     5.28   0.000     2.62e-06    5.72e-06
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
     sigma_u |  1.792e-06
     sigma_e |  3.440e-07
         rho |  .96446206   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
F test that all u_i=0:     F(113, 613) =   117.64            Prob > F = 0.0000
Economic Freedom maintains significance and the sign is persistently negative.
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This  is,  instead, what happens  in  the  same regression as Economic Freedom  is no
longer considered:
(R.16)
.  xtreg intensity gdp_2 population energ industry policy urban vehicles nuclear_energy , fe
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       778
Group variable: id_country                      Number of groups   =       118
R-sq:  within  = 0.1307                         Obs per group: min =         1
       between = 0.0002                                        avg =       6.6
       overall = 0.0000                                        max =        11
                                                F(8,652)           =     12.26
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.6301                        Prob > F           =    0.0000
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
   intensity |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
    gdp_2000 |  -1.58e-19   1.42e-19    -1.12   0.264    -4.37e-19    1.20e-19
  population |  -4.62e-15   2.77e-15    -1.67   0.096    -1.01e-14    8.23e-16
  energy_use |   3.19e-10   7.21e-11     4.42   0.000     1.77e-10    4.60e-10
    industry |  -2.19e-08   7.09e-09    -3.09   0.002    -3.58e-08   -7.97e-09
      policy |  -1.48e-07   6.58e-08    -2.25   0.025    -2.77e-07   -1.87e-08
       urban |   3.47e-08   1.57e-08     2.22   0.027     3.95e-09    6.55e-08
    vehicles |  -4.24e-09   6.66e-10    -6.37   0.000    -5.55e-09   -2.93e-09
nuclear_en~y |  -4.28e-08   9.40e-09    -4.55   0.000    -6.12e-08   -2.43e-08
       _cons |   9.61e-07   8.78e-07     1.10   0.274    -7.62e-07    2.68e-06
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
     sigma_u |  2.241e-06
     sigma_e |  4.181e-07
         rho |  .96637855   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------






.  xtreg intensity sub gdp_2 population energ industry policy urban vehicles nuclear_energy
> , fe
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       735
Group variable: id_country                      Number of groups   =       114
R-sq:  within  = 0.3406                         Obs per group: min =         1
       between = 0.0089                                        avg =       6.4
       overall = 0.0110                                        max =        11
                                                F(9,612)           =     35.12
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.5518                        Prob > F           =    0.0000
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
   intensity |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
    subindex |  -4.16e-08   3.04e-09   -13.72   0.000    -4.76e-08   -3.57e-08
    gdp_2000 |  -5.64e-21   1.14e-19    -0.05   0.961    -2.29e-19    2.18e-19
  population |  -6.27e-15   2.23e-15    -2.82   0.005    -1.06e-14   -1.90e-15
  energy_use |   2.02e-10   6.64e-11     3.04   0.002     7.17e-11    3.32e-10
    industry |   5.48e-09   6.34e-09     0.86   0.387    -6.97e-09    1.79e-08
      policy |  -9.15e-08   5.32e-08    -1.72   0.086    -1.96e-07    1.29e-08
       urban |   5.38e-09   1.30e-08     0.42   0.678    -2.01e-08    3.09e-08
    vehicles |  -1.42e-09   5.79e-10    -2.45   0.014    -2.56e-09   -2.83e-10
nuclear_en~y |  -3.86e-08   8.93e-09    -4.32   0.000    -5.62e-08   -2.11e-08
       _cons |   4.16e-06   7.65e-07     5.44   0.000     2.66e-06    5.66e-06
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
     sigma_u |  1.983e-06
     sigma_e |  3.344e-07
         rho |  .97236154   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
F test that all u_i=0:     F(113, 612) =   116.38            Prob > F = 0.0000
(R.18)
.  xtreg intensity subind population energ industry policy urban vehicles nuclear_energy , f
> e
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       735
Group variable: id_country                      Number of groups   =       114
R-sq:  within  = 0.3406                         Obs per group: min =         1
       between = 0.0087                                        avg =       6.4
       overall = 0.0108                                        max =        11
                                                F(8,613)           =     39.58
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.5532                        Prob > F           =    0.0000
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
   intensity |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
    subindex |  -4.16e-08   3.03e-09   -13.76   0.000    -4.76e-08   -3.57e-08
  population |  -6.31e-15   2.08e-15    -3.03   0.003    -1.04e-14   -2.22e-15
  energy_use |   2.02e-10   6.63e-11     3.05   0.002     7.18e-11    3.32e-10
    industry |   5.53e-09   6.27e-09     0.88   0.378    -6.79e-09    1.78e-08
      policy |  -9.17e-08   5.31e-08    -1.73   0.085    -1.96e-07    1.26e-08
       urban |   5.29e-09   1.28e-08     0.41   0.680    -1.99e-08    3.05e-08
    vehicles |  -1.42e-09   5.78e-10    -2.45   0.014    -2.55e-09   -2.83e-10
nuclear_en~y |  -3.86e-08   8.89e-09    -4.34   0.000    -5.60e-08   -2.11e-08
       _cons |   4.16e-06   7.58e-07     5.49   0.000     2.67e-06    5.65e-06
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
     sigma_u |  1.986e-06
     sigma_e |  3.341e-07
         rho |  .97246482   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------









aggregate  index,  which  includes  pieces  of  information  that may  be  irrelevant  or
misleading. Table  3  summarizes  the main  results  from  the  regressions performed
above.
From  the  table,  it  appears  evident  that  economic  freedom  –  whether  measured
through the Index or the Subindex – appears consistently, negatively correlated with
carbon intensity. Other variables which are consistently, negatively correlated with
carbon  intensity  include  the  share  of  nuclear  power  and,  to  much  surprise,  the
number  of  privately  vehicles.  Consistently,  positively  correlated  with  carbon
intensity are energy use, the share of industrial sector, energy imports, and in most
case the energy freedom second order term. Most of the other considered controls are



















R.1 I ‑ ‑ U, Im, In, E V I2, GDP2, N, P












R.5 I ‑ ‑ I2, GDP2, V, N, Im, Em
R.6 S ‑ ns S2, Im, N, GDP
2, U, P, In,
E
R.7 S ‑ S2, Im, In, E S3, V, N, GDP, GDP
2, U,
P
R.8 ln I, ns(*) ln, ‑ U, Im, P, In,
E
V, N
R.9 ln I, ns(*) ln, ‑ GDP2, Im, E V, N, I2, U, P, In,
R.10 S, L3, ‑ ns (S, L3)2, In N, GDP
2, U, V, Im,
P, E
R.11 S, L3, ‑ ns (S, L3)2, In (S, L3)3, N, GDP
2, U, V, Im,
P, E







R.14 I ‑ ns E, V, N P, In, Pol, U
R.15 I ‑ nt E V, N P, In, Pol, U
R.16 nt ns E, U, In, Pol, V,
N
P,
R.17 S ‑ ns E, P, V, N In, Pol, U
R.18 S ‑ nt E, P, V, N In, Pol, U
Table 3. Results of the 18 regressions. CE = coal as a share of energy consumption;
CO2C  =  coal‑related  carbon  dioxide  emissions;  E  =  energy  consumption;  Em  =
employment; ET = energy taxation; FDI = foreign direct investments; GDP = Gross
Domestic Product; I = Index of Economic Freedom; Im = share of energy imports; In
=  industrial  sector  as  a  share  of  the  economy; N  =  share  of  nuclear  power;  P  =












than a mere coincidence, here.  In  fact,  the  institutional  factors  that are explored to




While  this  result  is  far  from being  conclusive,  it  seems  to  suggest  that promoting
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assessing  its effectiveness  in achieving  the stated environmental  targets, assuming
not  every  country  in  the  world  will  be  willing  to  pursue  similar  targets.




the  policy’s  efficiency  and  allocational  efficiency.  Two models  of  carbon  tax  are
















the  renewable  share  is  to  be  referred  to  final  energy  consumption, will  the  total
consumption reduction goal has been turned into a non‑binding target of increasing
energy efficiency by 20%. The way to achieve such goals is embodied in a package of
directives  that was  launched by  the European Commission on  January  23rd,  2008.
Since  then,  a  wide  debate  emerged  and  some  major  changes  have  been  made.
Technical  issues  are  being debated,  too. After  a  long negotiation  in  late  2008,  the
Commission  has  proposed  an  amended  version  of  the Directive, which  has  been
passed by the EU Parliament and is now to be ratified by the member States.8
As  far  as  emissions  reductions  are  concerned,  Europe  plans  to  strengthen  its
Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS), a “cap & trade” mechanism that has been in place
since January 1st, 2005.
This  paper  intends  to  examine  the  objective  of  emission  reductions.  First we will
evaluate the usefulness of this objective from the point of view of its environmental
impact.  In  the  second  part we will  look  at  the  performance  of  European  climate
policies, while the third part will be focused on the Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS).
Although  the available data refer  to a  relatively short period, some elements have
already  emerged  and deserve  deep  reflection.  Finally,  in  the  fourth  part, we will


















The  benefits  far  outweigh  the  economic  costs.”9 This statement – contained in a
communication  of  the  Community’s  executive  body  preceding  the  2007  Spring
meeting of the European Council – rests on a previous communication of 2005 (that
“demonstrated  that  the  benefits  of  limiting  climate  change  outweigh  the  costs  of
action”),10 and also rests on the Stern Review (Stern 2006).
The  2005  communication  “demonstrates”  that  the  benefits  exceed  the  costs  in  a
succinct 12‑line paragraph to which were added two annexes on the effects of climate
change  (two  faces  of  a  sheet  of  paper  compiled  into  points  without  even  one
bibliographic reference even when long‑term projections are given) and a cost‑benefit
analysis  (less  than  three  pages  where  the  following  quote  by  IPCC  is  reported:











The  reference  to  the  Stern  Review  is  seemingly  more  solid.  The  report  was
commissioned by the British government to the former World Bank chief economist,




















the  possible  consequences  of  global warming.  In  all  cases,  by  simply  adopting  a



























calculus on  impacts  that might be  felt after  the year 2050. The  latter  two are
misleading;






But  the weakness  –  or  at  any  rate  the  selectivity  of  the  calculations  used  by  the
European Commission – is not the most exposed flank of the Community’s strategy
on  climate.  The  deepest  problem  concerns  policy  objectives,  functions,  and
consistence.





objective. Although  Europe  is  persuaded  of  the  human  responsibility  for  climate
changes, no one can exclude that all or part of the temperature increase is governed
by  natural  dynamics  such  as  solar  cycles  (see  Fig.  1)  (Soon  and  Yaskell  2004).
Therefore, Brussels could have set a target that goes beyond the powers that mankind
–  leave aside Europe – has  today of  influencing  the  environment.  In  this  sense,  it
would  have  been  desirable  to  express  the  objective  in  terms  of  stabilization  of
atmospheric  concentrations  of  carbon  dioxide  and  other  greenhouse  gases.
Furthermore,  the  ratio  between CO2  emissions  and  temperature  variation  (which,
rather, depends on atmospheric concentrations, not on yearly emissions) is subject to




Figure  1.  Artic  temperature,  solar  activity  and  cumulative  hydrocarbon
consumption. Source: Robinson, Robinson and Soon (2007).15
The  Fourth Assessment Report  (AR4)  of  the  Intergovernmental  Panel  on Climate




hypothesis  and  conjectures  underlying  the  IPCC  scenarios  are  valid  –  that  the
increase  of  temperature  in  the  absence  of  any  political  measure  stays  below  the
critical  threshold of  two degrees. This  fact  in  itself  should supply a precise policy
indication: as it is possible that the European efforts are useless – one way or another










During  the  Spring  2007  European  Council,  the  leaders  of  the  EU member  States
committed to a reduction of emissions of at least 20% by 2020, but also re‑launched a
further commitment to reduce the emissions by 30% if it becomes possible to find an
agreement  between  all  industrialized  countries.17 This is contradictory. If the
emissions cause global warming and if preventing global warming is the European
political priority, then the commitment to reduce emissions should be stronger, as the
participation  of  other  countries  is  smaller.  In  fact,  the  presumed  cause  of  global
warming  comes  from  global  emissions;  in  the  absence  of  reductions  by  other
countries, Europe should do more, not less, so that the same result is achieved. Why
is the Commission not following this simple logic? The answer, which is never given
openly   in  the  official  documents  of  the Union,  is  that  the  Commission  believes,
correctly,  that  the reduction  in emissions represents a ballast  for economic growth
and that it may cause a loss of international competitiveness. Europe does not want
to push beyond a certain limit which is set arbitrarily, without any preliminary study,




and hence  it demonstrates with  facts  that  it does not believe  in  the  studies  that  it
nevertheless calls on to support its policies. Then how do we explain the European
choices?  It  is  not  the  objective  of  this  paper  to  put  intentions  on  trial,  nor   to
investigate the ideological motivations or economic advantages of some effective and







10%  the market  share  by  2020),  and  it  prevents  or  discourages,  through  customs
duties,  the  import  of  biofuels  coming  from  tropical  countries,  which  are  more
economical and characterized by a lower environmental impact as compared to those





2012,  provided  that  other  developed  countries  commit  themselves  to  comparable  emission  reductions  and
economically  more  advanced  developing  countries  to  contributing  adequately  according  to  their
responsibilities  and  respective  capabilities”. Moreover,  “The  European  Council  emphasises  that  the  EU  is








leading  us  astray.  In  fact,  regardless  of  the  internal  contradictions  or  perhaps





–  to which Europe  itself belongs.  In other words,   European decisions are seen by
other actors, which react in sometimes a cooperative and sometimes an opportunistic
manner. When we talk about choices in energy policy, however, the influence of the
EU  on   the  rest  of  the world  is  relatively  low,  because  the  time  horizon  of  such
decisions  is very long. Today, everybody is an heir of  the choices made yesterday,
and those choices count for more than the acceleration of a certainly important actor
(but perhaps  less  important  than European governments might wish)  such  as  the
European Union. Therefore, although one can maintain that Europe could lead other
nations  on  the  sustainability  path  by  example,  so  far  that  does  not  seem  to  have
materialized,  and  the  EU  seems  to  be  a  leader  without  followers.  It  is  therefore




p.73),  “world  primary  energy  demand  is  projected  to  grow  by  more  than  half
between  2005  and  2030,  at  an  average  annual  rate  of  1.8%. Demand  reached  17.7
billion toe,  compared with  11.4  billion  toe  in  2005  –  a  rise  of  55%. Global  energy
intensity – total energy use per unit of gross domestic product – falls by 1.8% per year
over 2005‑2030”  (Figure 2). The growth will be dominated by  fossil  fuels  that will
confirm themselves as the heart of the world energy system: “Fossil fuels remain the
dominant  source of primary energy,  accounting  for 84% of  the overall  increase  in




remain  almost  stable,  as,  according  to  the projections,  it will moderately  increase
from 21% to 22% of the total. Next to the other forms of energy, the use of electricity
will increase noticeably, as it will grow, next to total consumption, from 17 to 22%.
Finally,  the  greatest  part  of  the  foreseen  growth  is  attributed  to  the  developing
countries which, thanks to the combination of demographic and economic growth,
will  be  responsible  for  74%  of  the  additional  demand  –  China  and  India  alone
accounting  for 45% of  the global additional demand of energy.  It  should be noted
95
that, in the alternative scenario of IEA (which assumes the adoption of iron‑fisted and
effective  measures  of  energy  savings  and  emissions  reduction),  in  spite  of  the
significant  reduction  of  demand  (11%  less  in  2030),  the  proportions  are  not
substantially  altered.  The  Paris‑based  Agency  also  elaborates  a  scenario
contemplating high growth – and that can be considered pessimistic from the point of
view of the European policy objectives – which is not considered here.
Figure  2. Global primary energy demand  in  the  reference  scenario. Source:  IEA
(2007)
If this is the future we are facing, the environmental implication is clear: in step with
energy  consumption,  greenhouse  gas  emissions  will  increase.  Even  by  limiting





















the  sake  of  simplicity  a  linear  path  between  the  values  of  the  global  emissions






policies at  the global  level. By means of  its own commitment,  the European Union
can  set  an  example  for  the  international  community  and  create  the  conditions  for
which its allegedly “virtuous” behaviour is followed by others. This is the solution to
the  prisoner’s  dilemma  à  la  Bruxelles:  the  European  actor  greatly  publicises  its
actions so as to convince others that the problem is so serious that it requires common
action  in  which  all  must  participate,  but  in  the  absence  of  that  action,  at  least




2007)  states  that  the  old  continent will  be  able  to  reach,  if  not  surpass,  the Kyoto
objectives –  that  is, an abatement of emissions of 8% below those of 1990 by 2012.
That, however, is true only for the 27‑member Union: the new member States are still
enjoying  the  dubious  privilege  of  being  former  Soviet  countries,  and  as  such
experienced  a  sudden and dramatic  contraction of  emissions  after USSR  collapse.
This,  however,  is  a  fact  that  is  not destined  to  repeat  itself,  to  the point  that  –  as















A  further  analysis  by  other  European  Environmental  Agency  official  documents
claims that “The policies and measures in place as of today will not be sufficient for






therefore,  suggest  that  an  aggregate  11.3%  reduction  below  the  baseline  can  be
achieved in the 2008‑12 commitment period.
Interestingly  enough,  last  year’s  estimates  claimed  that  a  4%  reduction below  the
baseline  could be achieved with existing policies  (as opposed  to 3.6%  in  the most
recent estimate, a 10% downsizing), while an extra 7% reduction could be achieved


















will not reach the objectives, and probably this  is  the most accurate forecast of  the
whole report (EEA 2009).
Even  more  interesting  is  the  way  in  which  the  Union  has,  so  far,  reduced  its
emissions. Table 1 reports the yearly variations declared by EEA together with the
explanations that, in its annual communiqués, the agency has supplied to explain the




both  on  industrial  choices  or  long‑term  policies,  and  on  demand,  which  in  turn
depends primarily on the temperature and on economic growth (or lack thereof), as
well as on  international prices of  fossil  fuels.  It  is  therefore not an exaggeration  to
state that if Europe gets more or less close to the Kyoto target, it will depend largely
on  variables  that  are  independent  from  climate  policies;  indeed  the  single  most






































200427 +0.3 • Increase in industrial emissions (iron, steel,
refrigeration, air conditioning).
+2.3





200629 ‑0.8 • Warm weather;
• High oil & gas prices.
+2.9
200730 ‑1.6 • Warm weather;
• High oil & gas prices.
+2.7
Table  1. Yearly variations of greenhouse emissions  in EU15  (1999‑2005). Source:
EEA. Economic growth (1999‑2005). Source: Eurostat.
Obviously, before  the  failure of European policies  is  assessed, a  closer  look at  the
European market for emissions rights is needed, which started operating in 2005, a
year characterized by mild  temperatures as well as by a reduction of emissions as














the  available  evidence  is  bare‑bone,  and  to  make  a  judgement  is  very  complex.
However,  it  is  essential  to  express  a  first  evaluation  because  from  it  –  and  from






slightly  over  a month  before  the  enforcement  of  the Kyoto  Protocol. However,  it
helps  to  remember  that  the environment  in which  the Emission Trading Directive
matured was profoundly  sceptical  towards  the  international  climate  treaty:  up  to
mid‑2004,  it  seemed destined  to  the  trash bin, as  it did not  seem possible  that  the
number of ratifying countries would be  sufficient to exceed the required 55 % quota
of 1990 total emissions. That was one of the conditions required by the protocol for its
application.  It  happened  only  –  and  surprisingly  –  in  the  Fall  of  2004,  with  the
announcement  and  then  the  ratification  by Russia, which  in  the  past was  always
ferociously  critical of Kyoto. The  change  in Russia’s position was due  to both  the





started with  the arrest  in 2003 of  the oligarch Mikhail Khodorkovsky, head of  the
private oil giant Yukos. The imprisonment of the tycoon and the dismemberment of





can  draw  “resources  from  the  energy  lever  and  decide whether,  if  and when,  to
address  them on other  sectors”. On  the other hand,  the Kremlin was  the  focus of
effective  pressures  from  Brussels  and  some  time  later  then  president  of  the
Commission Romano Prodi claimed the Russian adherence to Kyoto as his personal
success  and made  it  clear  that  it  was  the  price  to  pay  for  European  support  for
Moscow’s participation in the World Trade Organization.31




At any rate,  the fundamental point  is  that when the European Union designed the
ETS, it was convinced that this would be a great jump ahead of the rest of the world,





and  during which  companies  and  countries  are  called  to  obtain  the  objective  of
emission reductions by 8% next to the 1990 level. A large census at the European level
identified 12,000 plants operating  in  four  large sectors  (energy activities  including
combustion installations with a rated thermal input exceeding 20 megawatts, mineral
oil  refineries,  coke  ovens;  production  and  processing  of  ferrous  metals;  mineral
industry  including  cement  clinker,  glass  and  ceramic bricks;  and pulp, paper  and
board activities; from the end of the second phase, aviation will be added to the ETS




30th  each  year,   the  plant  will  have  to  return  a  number  of  permits  equal  to  its
emissions.  If  it  is  unable  to do  so,  or  it  did not have  a way  to  buy quotas  on  the
market,  it must pay a fine of €40 per ton of CO2 equivalent for the first phase, and
€100 per ton in the second phase. The first phase covers only carbon dioxide, while in













foresees  substantial  changes,  ranging  from  the  inclusion  of  new  sectors  to  the

































and  the next  turning point was on August 1st  (€21.38) when a period of very high
volatility took place until October (during these months, prices stayed within the €20‑





enough,  even  future  prices  reflect  the  downwards  trend:  the  forward  prices  at
December 2012 for allowances is little above €10, well below the above‑€17 that were
paid in late 2008.
As a matter of  fact, emissions  from the ETS sector  in 2007  (the  last year  for which









one  referring  to  the  pre‑2005  period  and  the  other  to  the  year  2005  –  and  he





ETS would  have  obtained  an  unfairly  favourable  treatment,  and  dumped  on  the
society  as  a  whole  the  largest  part  of  the  cost  of  reductions.  This  has  two
consequences.  In  the  first  place,  ETS  has  given  little  or  no  contribution  to  the
reduction of emissions during the first phase, thus nullifying – at least in part – that
first phase.  So,  the  entire  reduction effort will have  to be  concentrated  in  the  five
years that have just started, with a significant impact in terms of costs. In the second
place, to achieve this result, ETS will have to be managed with a greater severity and
the  initial  allocation  of  the  quotas  demands  greater  inflexibility.  The  national
allocation plans approved by the Commission for 2008‑12 reflect a sensitivity to these
issues (Brussels has issued 1,439 permits versus the 1,570 requested), but this – and,
in  junction,  the  prices  of  quotas, which went  back  to  pre‑2006  levels  –  allows  to




Other  authors,  such  as Ellerman and Buchner  (2006),  argued on  the  contrary  that
over‑allocation didn’t  take place.  In order to reach such conclusion, they defined a
benchmark  on  the  basis  of  2005  business  as  usual  emissions, which proved  to  be
higher than both the allocated permits, and the actual emissions. However, as Stefano
Clò  (2008,  p.10)  shows,  their  analysis  “does  not  indicate  how  much  the  ETS  is
contributing to emissions reductions in Europe compared to the non‑ETS sectors and
thus  to  which  extent  the  member  States  rely  on  the  ETS  to  achieve  their  Kyoto
emissions  reduction  target”.  By  relying  on  a  counter‑factual  scenario,  indeed,






Ellerman and Buchner were not able  to avoid possible biases due  to  the  fact  that,
among  other  reasons,  the  amount  of  emissions  produced  before  2005  by  the  ETS
installations was unknown (Grubb and Ferrario 2006).
Over‑allocation  may  have  significant,  negative  consequences  (Stefano  Clò  2008,
pp.23‑24). Assuming  the  overall  reduction  target will  still  be met,  over‑allocation
means  that  part  of  the  reduction  burden  will  be  shifted  onto  non‑ETS  sectors.
Alternatively, national governments might  take care of  the missing allowances, by
directly buying credits, or indirectly by subsidizing non‑ETS sectors: in this case, part
of  the  burden would  be  shifted  onto  tax  payers.  Also,  over‑allocation make  less
urgent  for  the  ETS  sectors  to  buy  international  credit, with  the  consequence  that
national  governments would  buy  them  (Neuhoff  et  al.  2006).  Finally,  the  overall
target might simply be missed because of over‑allocation, if neither of the above was
done (or not enough) – at virtually no economic cost, but at high political cost.
The  inherently political nature of  the allocation also shows another  side,  that  is, a
unfairness in the distribution of permits amongst the member States. Countries which
are  relatively  less  polluting  such  as  Italy  have  been  penalized, while  other more
carbon‑intensive nations (above all, Germany) issued an excessive number of permits
in the first phase. From this point of view, the second phase does not seem to bring



















Austria ‑1 150 2.21
Belgium 3 203 1.97
Denmark 14.4 105 2.50
Finland 12 230 1.59
France 19.1 177 1.40
Germany 21 162 2.33
Greece ‑0.1 200 3.08
Ireland ‑3.1 112 3.06
Italy ‑9.5 152 2.42
Luxemburg 0 184 2.64
Netherlands 6.1 183 2.17
Portugal 0.4 210 2.32
Spain ‑10.8 194 2.36
Sweden 3 175 0.96
UK ‑36.4 132 2.43
 Table  2.  Net  balance  2005  (allocated  emissions  –  verified  emissions),  energy
intensity  and  carbon  intensity  in  EU15  in  2005.  Source:  European Commission
2007.
Please  note  that  amongst  the  countries  that  have  recorded  an  important  negative
balance (Italy, Spain, UK), Italy is the only one that has recorded, in 2005, a near‑zero
economic growth rate.36  Unless we take into account the political dynamics behind
the  initial  allocation,  the  21 million  ton  CO2  excess  reported  by  Germany  is  not
comprehensible.  It  is  true that,  in 2005,  this country reduced its emissions by 2.3%
(23.5 million tons) below 2004, but that is mainly due to “a shift from coal to gas in
the production of public  electricity  and heat”  and  by  the  reduction  of  “emissions
from  road  transportation  and  from  households  and  services”.   Furthermore,  a
determining element has been a mild winter and the consequent low demand during










to over €20 as Phase 2 began –  leaving aside  the  following  fall, mainly due  to  the





the  business‑as‑usual  by  2010  (ICCF  2005).  Furthermore,  the  awareness  of  the










by  the  size  of  the  objectives  and by  the  short  time  span  in which  they  should  be
reached – and to the need for equity, the observation on the high level of inefficiency
of the system as a whole must be added. Stefano Clò writes: “permits over‑allocation
to  ETS  sectors  implies  that  these  sectors  will  have  a  lower  need  to  recur  to




being subjected  to  the same European regulation, different  firms competing  in  the











that  are  alternatively  reassuring  or  disturbing  about  the  future  regime  have  on
investments. Absent certainty, companies do not invest, and the result is not only that
of  reducing  the  reciprocal  competitive  pressures,  but  also  –  especially  from  the
environmental point  of  view –  to  reduce  the  rate  of  technological  innovation  and
















greatest  flaw  is  in  the  zone  of  uncertainty  which  the  directive  says  it  wants  to
eliminate but  instead amplifies. Beyond  the  statements of principle which  change




excessive  allocation  of  allowances  in  some  Member  States  and  some  sectors”.39
Notably, the Commission claims that ETS “represents the spearhead and ‘one of the
most  important  instruments’  of  EU  climate  policy  due  to  its  ability  to  achieve
absolute  emission  reductions  in  an  economically  efficient  manner”.40 There is,
though, no agreement on this very issue (Norregaard and Reppelin‑Hill 2000).















trading  period  until  2020  and  a  linear  reduction  of  the  cap  that  continues  the
reduction path beyond 2020, thereby giving a clear message to investors”.42 The other
fundamental  choice  concerning  the  third  phase  is  about  the  passage  from
grandfathering  to  auctioning  in  the  allocation  of  quotas,  such  as  to  guarantee





















the  presumed  rule  is  applied.  One  line  after  stating  that  allocation  for  the
thermoelectric sector is to be performed through auctioning from 2013 on, the report
adds that, “in order to encourage a more efficient generation of electricity, electricity
generators  could  however  receive  free  allowances  for  heat  delivered  to  district







from  free  distribution  to  auctioning will  take  place  gradually  and  in  function  of
several factors.
It  should be noted  that enterprises are  told  that,  from now to  the end of  the  third




is  no  doubt  about  this)  this  establishes  a  competitive  disadvantage  for  some




enterprises  (which ones? And  in which  sectors?) according  to  the  choices of other
sovereign  nations.  The  definition  of  “certainty”  which  is  in  vogue  in  Brussels




For  installations  in  other  sectors  [other  than  thermoelectric],  a  gradual
transition is appropriate, starting with free allocation at a level of 80 % of their
share  in  the  total  quantity  of  allowances  to  be  issued,  decreasing  by  equal
amounts each year, arriving at zero free allocation by 2020.  In the event that
other developed countries and other major emitters of greenhouse gases do not
participate  in  an  international  agreement  that  will  achieve  the  objective  of






situation by  June 2011 at  the  latest,  consult with all  relevant  social partners,
and,  in  the  light  of  the  outcome  of  the  international  negotiations,  submit  a














receive  up  to  100  %  of  allowances  free  of  charge  or  an  effective  carbon
equalisation system could be  introduced with a view to putting  installations
from the Community which are at a significant risk of carbon leakage and those
from  third  countries  on  a  comparable  footing.  Such  a  system  could  apply
requirements  to  importers  that  would  be  no  less  favourable  than  those




lobbies  in  future  years  will  rise  to  its  height  as  well.  The  Commission’s  design






losers at  the  same  time”.   By  the  same  token,  it  is not possible  to pursue efficient
allocation – where the permits actually go to those willing to pay more – which is fair
at  the  same  time.  By  fair,  we mean  being  careful  to  not  allow  excessive  growth
(whatever that means) in the costs for some less substantial actors, whether these are
relatively less developed countries or consumers with less available income.
A  similar  uncertainty  concerns  the  destination  of  the  cash  flow  from  auctioning.
Although  it  remains  available  to  the member  states  (and  is  therefore  considered
normal  tax  income),  “a  certain percentage  of  the proceeds  from  the  auctioning of





measures  to avoid deforestation and  facilitate adaptation  in developing countries,
and  for addressing social aspects  such as possible  increases  in electricity prices  in




between  them,  implies  a  huge  question mark,  as  there  is  a  very  ample definition
which  leaves  enormous  room  for  political  arbitrariness.  In  some  cases,  such  as









entities connected  to  the European emission exchange system. Here  too, what  this
means  specifically,  and which  behaviours  are  and  are  not  legitimate,  is  not  and
cannot be clear.
In general, there is no indication of effort in the proposed directive to put together a
system  which  is  what  the  Commission  says  it  wants,  and  which  is  a  clear  and
predictable  mechanism.  The  very  choice  of  auctioning,  with  its  function  of  the
depoliticising of  the  initial  allocation  eliminated or  at  any  rate  limited,  seemingly
reduces itself to an infernal mechanism. On the one hand, the mechanism acts as a
pre‑emptive  tax on enterprises, who obviously will  attempt  to pass  the costs onto




progress  and  with  the  good  functioning  of  the  market.  All  that  with  a  further
aggravation:  as  the  price  of  the  emission  quotas  has  been  and  probably  will  be
volatile,  the  public  proceeds  of  the  initial  allocation  can  hardly  be  forecast.




its  complexity,  it will  hardly  be  able  to  become  the  object  of  true  public  debate.
Paradoxically  in  view  of  the  premises,  this  allows  an  extremely  high  degree  of
politicization of the system in each of its stages: in the initial allocation of permits, in
the  possible  additional  allocations,  in  the  concession  of  exemptions  or  facilitated
conditions,  and  in  the use of  the  revenues. Clearly,  the  supporters of  a  restrictive
policy of control of emissions have a good game  in  favouring policies  the costs of
which  are  not  visible  to  consumers  (Stavins  1998).  It  is  however  natural  to  ask





with  the  induction of  few or no distortions  in  the  internal market  (under  the non
obvious assumption that emissions reductions are in the public interest, in the first
place).  All  in  all,  the  impression  is  that  the  Commission  is  designing  a  sort  of











necessary  consensus,  a  number  of  concessions  have  been made. A  version  of  the
Directive amended accordingly has been advanced by the Commission and approved








• Of  the  total  allowances  to  be  auctioned,  88  %  will  distributed  among  the
member  States  proportionally  to  past  verified  emissions;  10  %  will  be







o  to  reduce  greenhouse  gas  emissions,  including  by  contributing  to  the
Global  Energy  Efficiency  and  Renewable  Energy  Fund  and  to  the
Adaptation Fund as operationalised by UNFCCC COP 14 in Poznan , to
adapt  to  the  impacts  of  climate  change  and  to  fund  research  and
development as well as demonstration projects  for reducing emissions
and  adaptation  ,  including  participation  in  initiatives  within  the
framework of  the European Strategic Energy Technology Plan and the
European Technology Platforms;
o  to  develop  renewable  energies  to  meet  the  commitment  of  the
Community  to  using  20%  renewable  energies  by  2020,  as  well  as  to
develop other  technologies contributing  to  the  transition  to a safe and
sustainable  low‑carbon economy and  to help meet  the commitment of
the Community to increase energy efficiency by 20% by 2020;
o  for  measures  to  avoid  deforestation  and  increase  afforestation  and
reforestation  in  developing  countries  that  have  ratified  the  future
international  agreement  ;  to  transfer  technologies  and  to  facilitate
adaptation to the adverse effects of climate change in these countries;
o for forestry sequestration in the EU;




o  to  finance  research  and  development  in  energy  efficiency  and  clean
technologies in the sectors covered by the scope of the directive;
o  for measures  such as  those  intended  to  increase energy efficiency and
















While  some of  the  shortcomings  of  the  earlier  version  of  the Directive have  been
apparently fixed, most of them still remain (Stefano Clò 2009). Particularly, the high
level of uncertainty regarding which sectors and subsectors will enjoy the allocation
of  free  of  charge  allowances  is  not  reduced.  This  will  comparatively  reduce  the
amount  of  investments  in  innovation  or  measures  that  might  actually  reduce
emissions. The fact that not just the Commission, but also member States are allowed
to put in place measures as to address the risk of carbon leakage – or, more broadly,

















sources and carbon‑intensive  industrial processes are made more costly,  and  low‑
carbon or carbon‑free technologies are subsequently advantaged. Theoretically, if the
overall  cap  is  sufficiently  stringent  and  if not  too many  sectors  or  subsectors  are
recipient of  free of  charge allowances,  there would be  little or no need  for  further
incentives or subsidies. In fact, the latter might even distort the well functioning of
the electricity market or other markets, by inducing a political allocation, rather than









That  is  even more  true  in  a  case  such as  that  of  greenhouse  emissions, which are





is  because  not  all  processes  can  obtain  the  same  results.  In  some  cases,  it  is
technologically  and  economically  possible  to  pursue  consumption  or  emission
reductions, and alternatives are available. In other cases, that does not happen. The
number of scientific uncertainties and the necessarily long‑term projection of policies
– which  should  take  technological progress  into  account  – multiply  the  risks  that
regulation will fail.




an explicit price signal  to regulated firms and  individuals”  (Hepburn 2006, p.228).
These instruments consist of instruments based on price and those based on quantity.





In theory, and in the abstract,  there  is no reason to prefer one  instrument over the






Finally,  considerations  concerning  transaction  costs  underlying  the  creation  of  an
explicit market within a regulation of quantities are of importance. To this end, we
will  consider  here  two  options:  the  ETS  on  one  hand  –  which  assigns  a  cap  to
greenhouse emissions and allows a market for emission quotas – and the carbon tax






prefer  either  one  (Downing  and White  1986; Milliman  and  Prince  1989).  Requate
(1998) argues that, while both policy instruments can be preferable under different
conditions,  a  tax  system might  prevent  a  real  competition  between non‑polluting





quickly  as we move  from  eliminating  the  cheap,  ‘low  hanging  fruit’  on  to more
difficult  sources  of  emissions  (e.g.  aviation  transport).  Suppose  also  that,  because
damages from climate change are a function of the stock of greenhouse gases in the
atmosphere,  they are only a weak  function of emissions over  short periods  (e.g. 5





is  far  more  expensive  than  in  countries  that  are  less  energy‑efficient,  such  as
Germany,  let  alone  countries  that  are  far  less  efficient  such  as  the  emerging
economies,  including China and  India. Think,  for example,  that  the efficiency of a
coal‑powered plant in Europe exceeds 40%, while in China the average efficiency is
around 20%. If it were possible to export European technology to China for all new
installations,  it would be possible  to obtain, at a  relatively  low cost, a much more















damages  in global warming gives a  strong presumption  to price‑type approaches.
The  reason  is  that  the  benefits  of  emissions  reductions  are  related  to  the  stock  of
greenhouse gases, while the costs of emissions reductions are related to the flow of
emissions. This  implies  that  the marginal  costs of  emissions  reductions are highly
sensitive  to  the  level  of  reductions,  while  the  marginal  benefits  of  emissions
reductions are insensitive to the current level of emissions reductions”.
In  these  conditions,  an  instrument  of  price  regulation  seems  preferable  to  one  of
quantity regulation.
To  these  considerations  on  efficiency  we  can  add  one  concerning  the  proper
operation of the policies. From the institutional point of view, the creation of a market
for emission quotas such as ETS – destined to have a growing level of complexity and







lobbies  and member  States,  and within  each  of  these  groups. What  is worse,  the
boundaries between these components of the decisional process are fuzzy and hardly
distinguishable.  All  in  all,  it  is  virtually  impossible  to  know  whether  a  certain





a valid argument  in  support of a  carbon  tax as opposed  to a  cap &  trade scheme.
Because of its nature, a carbon tax guarantees top transparency. Everyone knows that
for  each  ton  of CO2 produced,  they will have  to pay,  say,  €25  (just  to  indicate  an
amount  in  line  with  the  forward  prices  of  the  emission  quota  on  ETS  which  is
consistent  as we  shall  see with  the  suggestions  of  climate  economists).  To  obtain
maximum  transparency  it  would  be  appropriate  to  imagine  a  system  of
transferability,  so  that  the  tax  is  (or  at  least  may  be)  entirely  passed  on  to  the
consumer. That meets the need to give the consumer the function of allocating the
emission reductions  in  the most efficient way,  that  is, a way  that  responds on one
hand to a cost criterion and on the other to the relative replaceability of products at
greater emission intensity. In this way, the market would be free to operate, although







demands,  of  course,  the  traceability  of  the  emissions.  But  that  is  possible  with









lower and  thus – all other conditions being equal –  the demand  increases and  the
market share of  the  innovative enterprise grows as a consequence. But even if  this
were not enough –  that  is,  if  the additional profits  from the greater sales were not
sufficient  to  cover,  in  a  reasonable  amount  of  time,  the  cost  of  investments  –  the
system could be reinforced by recognizing a tax credit or other forms of write‑offs of
the  investments  employed  to  reduce  emissions.  It  is  obvious  that  this  foresees  a
spread and sharing of information especially concerning benchmarking to evaluate
the  innovative  contents  of  the  investments,  but  it  certainly defines  a more  linear,










added.  In  the  first  place,  a  system  like  ETS  required  the  assignment  of  sectoral
targets, and thus not only does it imply a significant degree of arbitrariness, but also,
due to  its own nature,  it creates continuous clashes of  lobby groups. In the second
place,  and more  importantly,  a  carbon  tax  is  the  only  way  to  call  all  sectors  to
contribute  in  the  most  efficient  way  to  emission  reductions.  Besides  its  internal
limitations, ETS is also limited to a few sectors, and therefore covers only part of the
parties involved in emission reductions. As a result, ETS adds itself to other public
















reduction of  income  should not  lead  to  any particular decision  in  the  short  term.
Albrecht  suggests  (and  this  is  consistent  with  the  proposal  here  advanced  on
transferability of  the  tax)  inserting environmental  tax  (including a carbon tax)  in a
general reform of consumption taxes. In the second place, what is to be done with the
income  of  the  carbon  tax?  Should  the  member  States  use  it,  as  the  European
Commission would  like  to  do with  a  part  of  the  income  from  the  auctioning  of
permits, to finance environmental programs (whatever could be included under this
label, read: anything) does not seem a reasonable solution, as  it causes distortions.
Furthermore,  the  carbon  tax  assigns  an  implicit  advantage  to  sources  and
technologies that are “clean”, but also puts them all on the same level. Conversely,
incentive  programs  assign  differentiated  subsidies,  further  misrepresenting  the
operation of the market. Since one of the effects of a carbon tax – and the main one
from the point of view of consumers – is the increase in the prices of consumption
goods  including some that are widely used and considered  indispensable,  such as
electricity  and  transportation  fuels,  it  seems  that  the  request  to  cut  the  reform of






















Table  4.  Simulation  of  price  increases  of  some  energy  products with  a  €25/ton
CO2eq carbon tax in the absence of an environmental tax reform. (*) Emissions due
to combustion alone; 7‑10% should be added  to  take  into account  the emissions
concerning  refining  and  transport.  (#)  Combined  cycle with  50%  efficiency.  (°)
Steam turbines, counterpressure/condensation/conventional with 38% efficiency.
(§)  Steam  turbines,  counterpressure/condensation/conventional  with  37%
efficiency. Source: own elaboration from various sources.














the  introduction  of  carbon  tax  with  the  reduction  of  the  income  tax  and  the
rationalization and  significant  reduction of  subsidies of  renewable  energy  sources
could, paradoxically, and although the causes are certainly debatable, determine an





although  altered  by  an  emission  tax  –  the  task  of  allocating  emission  reduction.
Furthermore,  by  inducing  general  relief  of  fiscal  pressure,  the  carbon  tax  could
represent  an  important  element  in  the  restoration  of  competitiveness  on  the  old
continent.  Of  course,  such  a  restoration would  not  be  absolute,  but  it  would  be
effective if part of a comprehensive project and related to the current situation.
Both the carbon tax and a cap & trade system have the effect of increasing the final
prices of  a  series of products. But, while  the  cap &  trade  seems  to proceed down
mysterious  paths,  the  tax  acts  in  visible  mode.  This  visibility  establishes  two
consequences.  In the first place,  it allows greater price transparency and gives  less
grounds  for  vaguely populistic  protests, while  offering  fewer  reasons  for  policies
heavily  oriented  towards  price  control  in moments when,  for  the most  disparate
reasons,  the prices go beyond a  level  that  is arbitrarily considered too high.  In  the
second place, even the regressive effects of the carbon tax – which are, in substance,









single  carbon‑based  source of  energy has been weighed  for  its  own  share of  2007












To  understand what  consequences might  follow,  one  should  look  at  the  demand
elasticity for energy. Price elasticity for electricity is generally found relatively low in
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empirical  studies,  especially  in  the  short  run.  Elasticity  in  the  long  run  might,





be expected  to determine a  short  run demand reduction of 0.64%, and a  long  run
reduction of 1.14%.
As far as the demand for motor fuels is concerned, Liu (2004) estimates a short run
elasticity  of  ‑0.191  for  gasoline,  and  ‑0.094  for  diesel.  Long  run  estimate  are,
respectively,  as  high  as  ‑0.318  and  ‑0.516.  A  review  of  the  most  recent  studies
performed by Goodwin, Dargay and Hanly  (2004)  found an average  elasticity  for
motorfuels of ‑0.25 in the short run (in the range between ‑0.01 and ‑0.57), and of ‑0.64
in  the  long  run  (with a  range  that varies  from 0  to  ‑1.81). This means  that a price





with  changes  in  demand  due  to  changes  in  income  (and  viceversa).  Also,
technological progress and public policies may affect energy consumption in several
ways,  which  may  not  be  fully  captured  in  models  trying  to  estimate  demand
elasticities. As  a  consequence,  the  estimates  tend  to  have  a  very wide  confidence
interval.




The  above‑mentioned  problem  can  be  overcome  if  a  further  question  is  correctly
answered. The question is: What is the policy goal? If the goal is to reduce emissions
(or energy consumption) by a given amount, at any cost, then cap & trade (or even







cost  of  global  warming’s  impact  with  the  costs  of  mitigation  measures  that  are
adopted  today.  It  will  also  be  possible  to  appropriately  set  prices  or  quantities,
depending on the kind of policy which is implemented. Naturally, such comparison
should be made at  the margin. Tol  (2003) reviewed the most recent studies on  the
issue. The findings are the following: “the best guess for the marginal costs of carbon
dioxide emissions is $5/tC, but the mean is $104/tC. This difference reflects the large
uncertainty combined with  the notion  that negative surprises are more  likely  than














2100.  This  path  reduces  CO2  concentrations,  and  the  increase  in  global  mean







(a)  reduce  its  predictability  and  (b)  require  a  continue  re‑assessment  of  the  best
science by national governments or other international bodies concerned with climate
change. While some degree of policy change is necessary, as scientific understanding
of  global warming  provides more  information,  a  continual  revision  of  the  policy
might not be  the best possible  solution.  In  fact,  it would  require policy‑makers  to
follow the scientific debate up to an extent they are not possibly qualified, and might
determine an even stronger politicization of science, which would make the political
debate  between  scientists  as much  vocal  as  the  scientific  debate  between  policy‑
makers (Pielke 2006; Lindzen 2008).











to  test  the policy  ramp by observing  the  response of a  state variable  to  the policy
itself,  as  well  as  to  other  factors  which may  or  may  not  be  known.  A  Bayesian






In  taking  advantage  of  these  arguments, McKitrick  (2008)  propose  a  pricing  rule
which is designed in a way that it, so to speak, corrects itself, as a reaction to a state
function which  is  easily  observable.  The  real  issue,  in  this  perspective,  is  not  the
pricing rule per se, but to find an agreement over the state function. In fact, assuming
that  temperature (or average temperature) can provide the relevant  information,  it
makes  a  lot  of  difference,  both  in  temperature  levels  and  in  temperature  trends,
where you take the measure. Surface temperature data’s quality has been questioned,
both with  regard  to  land  temperature  (de Laat and Maurellis 2006; McKitrick and
Michaels 2007) and over oceans (Thompson et al. 2008; Christy et al. 2001). Measures
from  weather  balloons  are  also  disputable  (Lanzante  and  Free  2008).  McKitrick
suggests that weather satellites may provide the most stable and reliable metric since
when  they collect  tropospheric data  (1979)  (Spencer and Christy 1990; CCSP 2006;
Randall  and  Herman  2008).  Subsequently,  it  should  be  decided  where  to  take
temperatures:  following  IPCC (2007) and CCSP (2006), McKitrick proposes  to  take
reference temperatures  in the tropical region,  from 20 degrees North to 20 degrees
South.
McKitrick,  hence,  suggests  that  the  mean  temperature  as  measured  by  weather
satellites in the tropical troposphere may provide a workable definition of the state
function, that is the input of a pricing rule for a carbon tax policy. Remarkably, “if the
present  trend  continues  the Nordhaus  path  and  the  state‑contingent  path would
closely  coincide”  (McKitrick  2008,  p.12).  The  most  compelling  aspect  of  such
proposal, is that it provides a policy instrument that deals with uncertainty. At the
same  time,  it  doesn’t  need  too much of  an  information  exchange between policy‑
makers and scientists, except for the obvious need to keep correcting the policies if it




the  temperature measurements  in  the  tropical  troposphere  (which are  subject  to a
relatively wide natural variability, independent from climate change), one benefit of
the carbon tax over a cap & trade scheme (more predictability) might be lost.
Several  responses  can  be  provided.  First,  even Nordhaus’  policy  ramp would  be
updated, based upon a less objective variable – climate forecasts vs. actual climate.
This  is a key point,  in terms of  limiting the interaction between policy‑makers and
scientific debates they may not be able to fully understand. Moreover, a consensus







experts,  who  provide  the  management  with  an  assessment  of  the  best  available
science. So,  companies would have  their own expectations  regarding  climate,  and
based  upon  these  they  can  have  their  own  forecasts  about  the  future  levels  of  a




issue,  because  from  the  expectations  regarding  future  temperatures,  the  future
investment strategies would derive. So, any party would have an interest in assessing
the most  likely  outcome,  not  the  outcome  that would  be most  likely  to  yield  the
desired  policies.  By  the  same  token,  it  is  likely  that more  information would  be
generated and made available, and the understanding of global warming would be
improved.
Fifth,  it  is  true  that Nordhaus policy ramp relies on projections  (so  it  incorporates
some  knowledge  about  the  future)  while McKitrick  pricing  rule  relies  on  actual
temperatures  (thereby  responds  only  to  the  past).  At  the  same  time,  however,
projections  for  future  temperatures  rely  on  the  past  record  too,  and  the  current
temperatures are part of a trend that began long time ago and is expected to continue
for  a  long  time  in  the  future.  It will  take  time,  in  fact,  for  emission  reductions  to
produce a sufficient reduction in the stock of GHGs in the atmosphere, that will in
turn  slow down  the warming process.  So  there  is  a  lag  –  that  can’t  be  avoided  –













flow)  to  reduce  atmospheric  concentrations  of GHGs  tomorrow  (a  stock)  in
order  to  achieve  the  goal  of  containing  temperatures  increase.  Several
uncertainties  and  confounding  factors  are  involved,  that  might  induce
misunderstandings  or  misconceptions.  In  fact,  a  major  possible  (if  not
probable)  shortcoming  of  a  cap  &  trade  scheme  lies  exactly  in  the
determination of the cap, which is subject to far greater uncertainties and risks
of being politically derailed than the determination of the tax in a price‑based
policy.  The  problem would  be made  even  bigger  by  the  above‑mentioned
policy  instruments  that  the  European  Union  and/or  other  actors  are
considering in order to put in motion a cap & trade scheme.
(b) Under  a  cap &  trade  scheme where  the  cap  is  set with  regard  to  ambitious
environmental  goals  (e.g.,  keeping  global  average  temperatures  below  2
degrees  more  than  the  pre‑industrial  levels)  that  may  not  be  completely
controlled and that are subject to a number of uncertainties and confounding











is  a  fundamental  feature  of  a  policy which  aims,  among  the  other  goals,  at
creating a  framework  for  innovation.  If uncertainty relative  the carbon price
adds  to  “normal” market uncertainties,  the payoff  as well  as  bankability  of
investments might  become  less  uncertain,  too.  And,  again, more  resources
might be devoted to lobbying activity and to pay for the price of permits (that,
differently  from a  carbon  tax, might be hardly  transferred onto  consumers),
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might be employed  in reducing  income or  labor  taxes, or other  taxes. Therefore, a
carbon tax may well be made revenue‑neutral. That is far more complex in the case of


















unstable,  and  ultimately  such  as  to  leave  a  great  discretionary  power  to  the

















other  instruments  that  could  have  been  adopted  and which,  in  spite  of  the  little
attention they have received in Brussels, could perhaps have obtained better results
at  lower  costs.  Specifically,  the  carbon  tax  option  has  a  series  of  practical  and




about  their  benefits  as  well,  and  therefore  the  opportunity  of  imposing  binding
domestic  targets.  This  is  particularly  important  in  light  of  both  the  scientific
uncertainties  that  still  remain  and  are  quite  substantial  –  on  the  global warming
phenomenon and on the high probability that will remain politically isolated in the
short term in the effort to reduce emissions. From this stems the substantial practical
uselessness  of  the  European  policies,  even  if  they  were  justified,  effective  and







would  be  more  easily  implemented,  more  stable,  more  predictable,  and  more
responsive  to  the  actual  changes  in  the  climate.  From  a  certain  point  of  view,
therefore, the lesser political feasibility, due to the difficulty of harvesting consensus
on  a  tax  and  the  need  to  substantially  reformulate  the  fiscal  system,  is  a  further
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